下面两篇说的是weevil,一种甲虫,能传粉,根据google上的资料,效率比人工授粉好20%。除了这个外,还有蜜蜂也能传粉。
http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/buku/Article/
Of oil palm, douches, insects and Tamil songs
By Ooi Tee Ching
Published: 2008/12/13
YOU can always tell a planter's hands. They are big, calloused, wrinkled and very, very strong.
When I first shook hands with Datuk Leslie Davidson, a 77-year-old former planter, I was left with numb fingers before blood flowed into my right hand.
In an interview with Davidson and Mahbob Abdullah, his friend and former subordinate, both talked about their upcoming books.
Scheduled to be launched in early 2009, the books tell of their amusing and poignant experiences as planters in the tropics between the 1950s and the 1980s.
Davidson was also in Kuala Lumpur to receive the Merdeka Award from Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi for his outstanding contribution to Malaysian people.
The Merdeka Award, a Petronas initiative co-founded with ExxonMobil and Shell, came with a trophy, certificate and RM500,000 cash.
Davidson's contribution could be attributed to efforts 30 years ago when he initiated efforts to get weevils, insects from Cameroon, to pollinate oil palm trees in Malaysia. Since then, the oil palm trees have been merrily producing more fruit bunches, making Malaysia the world's biggest palm oil exporter.
As Davidson sat himself down beside Mahbob, he said, "the Merdeka Award is actually a team effort".
I stole a glance at Mahbob. "My boss is right. Maybe the award money should be divided among team members, too," he said, and laughed, "there were thousands of us".
In chapter 10 of Mahbob's book titled "Planters Tales" and chapter 37 of Davidson's "East of Kinabalu", they tell how oil palm companies had to spend a lot of money to hire hundreds of workers just to manually harvest pollens from male flowers of oil palm trees to pollinate female flowers.
Teams of workers patrolled the estate daily searching for male flowers to collect the pollens. This was then issued to other teams who went around pollinating every receptive female flowers with hand puffers.
"Ironically, by trial and error, we found the ideal instrument for this delicate operation to be vaginal douches," he said.
When Davidson submitted orders for vaginal douches, Unilever headquarters in London was very surprised and immediately questioned if he was carrying out birth control programmes among his estate workers.
Davidson promptly replied, "Oh, quite the contrary, we're actually trying to increase fertility rates among the trees to get them bear more fruits".
While top management approved of the orders, Davidson was constantly reminded that Sabah estates' oil palm yields were lower than in Johor and Cameroon.
Undeterred and unconvinced by textbook knowledge which claimed that palm fruits were wind-pollinated and that heavy rain washes pollen away, Davidson arranged for more research to prove that pollination in West Africa was largely due to weevils which were not found in Malaysia.
Under Davidson's instruction, Dr Kang Siew Ming, Zam Karim, Dr Tay Eong Beok and Mahbob went to Cameroon to assess the work of Dr Rahman Anwar Syed, the entomologist who was assigned to study oil palm pollination by insects in Africa, especially the Elaieidobius kamerunicus specie.
"It ended up with the two ladies Dr Kang and Zam climbing the oil palm trees," Mahbob said.
Asked what he and and Dr Tay did while the ladies were up on the trees, Mahbob replied, "we stood underneath and made sure that they didn't fall down".
Jokes aside, Mahbob is most probably remembered among members of East Malaysia Planters Association for being the very persuasive money collector for the RM2 million weevils project.
The Unilever Group was the first to pay but Sabah Land Development Board was the biggest contributor.
Incidentally, the estates that Davidson and Mahbob used to work and live in Johor and Sabah are now owned by IOI Corp Bhd. To this day, the almost 70-year-old IOI Group executive chairman Tan Sri Lee Shin Cheng still makes his regular rounds at these estates.
Lee's talent in serenading Tamil songs to his oil palm trees may seem surprising to many but it reflected Incorporated Society of Planters (ISP) requirement that all planters must be proficient in commonly-used languages at the estates.
Davidson recalled preparing for the Malay and Hakka language tests almost 60 years ago. At that time, the ISP examiner said, "You will find Hakka very useful in North Borneo," and asked, "Nyi thuk-ko-kai shu, han ki-tet mau? (Do you still remember your studies?)"
Davidson replied, "Yit pan ki-tet, yit pan mong-ki liau. (Half remember, half forgotten.)
The examiner liked what he heard and Davidson passed the Hakka test with flying colours.
Mahbob was also lucky. In his second book entitled "Planter Upriver", Mahbob told how he was slow to start learning Tamil but eventually aced the test.
At that time, Mahbob's contract as an assistant manager at Tanah Merah Estate in Tangkak, Johor, required him to pass the Tamil language test. He found a very patient tutor in Krishnan, an 18-year-old son of a worker. Also, Mahbob's love for Tamil and Hindi movies might have helped.
Asked if he is able to sing Tamil songs, he winked and smiled, "If Tan Sri Lee invites me to his estates, I certainly don't mind a duet".
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/12/6/business/2710880&sec=business
Merdeka Award winner proud of long plantation career
By ERROL OH
IT has been 17 years after Datuk Leslie Davidson’s retirement as chairman of Unilever’s plantation arm. And twice as many years have passed since he had last worked in an estate in Malaysia. Yet, he remains a passionate admirer and an acute observer of our oil palm industry, albeit from his home in Sussex, England.
When you engage him in a discussion on palm oil issues and developments, be prepared for a deluge of information and opinion. He has plenty to say and often, one idea quickly segues into another. “Go on, keep me to the point,” he urges the interviewer.
Steering the conversation in the right direction is not really an important consideration. With four decades of experience in the business of cultivating oil palm, Davidson, 77, is a storehouse of stories and views. If you had the time, you would want to hear all that he has to share.
Datuk Leslie Davidson
His is a fairly unique perspective. The Scotsman began his career at Unilever Plantations International in 1951 as a trainee planter in Kluang, Johor. Prior to that, he had spent two years in the national service, mostly in Kenya, and that experience kindled Davidson’s yen for adventure.
Neither keen to go back to school nor enthusiastic about being desk-bound, he applied for a job with Unilever, anticipating that he would be sent back to Africa, where the company owned plantations. Instead, he was offered a posting in Malaya. He was not yet 21 and he was on his way to a country in the throes of the Emergency. Because of his age, his mother had to give her written consent before he could take up the appointment. Mrs Davidson agreed to do so only after she had been assured by the Unilever management that her son would be safe.
In the line of fire
In fact, Kluang was a hotbed of communist activity and European planters were among the primary targets. Davidson was essentially a non-combatant in a war zone, although he was provided with some protection. While the insurgency raged on, the possibility of being gunned down by guerillas was very much a part of his life.
One of his most poignant memories was when he learnt the fate of fellow young planter Gerry Tilley, an ambush casualty.
“He came to my house for makan on Sunday. We played with our guns, shooting at cans and stuff. The next morning, I was driving around the estate and somebody said Gerry had been killed just hours ago,” he recalls in an interview with StarBizWeek during his recent trip to Malaysia.
“He was my only close friend at the time. A lot of people died, which is why I’m one of the lucky ones. I could have been lying dead in a ditch in Kluang if I didn’t have a bit of luck.”
But it took more than mere good fortune to keep Davidson on the path that led him to the Kuala Lumpur City Centre on the evening of Nov 24, when Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi presented him with the Merdeka Award.
The award is a big deal. It was created last year by ExxonMobil, Petronas and Shell to commemorate Malaysia’s 50th year of independence. It is considered our version of the Nobel Prize and it comes with RM500,000 cash. Davidson is among the five inaugural recipients. His award is in the Outstanding Contribution to the People of Malaysia category.
It is recognition for the ‘’most worthy candidate who has made an outstanding and substantial contribution to Malaysia or the people of Malaysia, resulting in the significant improvement of the lives or the quality of life of Malaysians’’.
The triumph of weevil
He was judged worthy of the award because of his pivotal role in pushing for the 1981 introduction of an insect native to Africa, Elaeidobius kamerunicus (better known here as the pollinating weevil), to pollinate oil palm in Malaysia. This has allowed oil palm growers in the region to significantly raise productivity and save cost.
Davidson is eager to dispel the notion that the glory is all his. He tries some humour. He tosses off the theory that he was given the award because he is the oldest ex-planter around.
Then, he gets serious. He points out that many people were involved in the studies and the lobbying, stretched over several years, that led to the Government’s approval for the release of the weevil in Malaysia. And he goes beyond that to share credit.
“The development of the oil palm industry is undoubtedly a major story in the history of tropical agriculture. No other crop has been so successful,” he argues.
“When I came in 1951, the total palm oil production in Malaya was 50,000 tonnes. Now, any estate produces that amount. And the total has gone from 50,000 to 16 million tonnes in an astonishingly short period. That’s the most amazing thing. So, yes, I do believe that the award is for the industry.”
Even with his part in the tale of the pollinating weevil, Davidson might not have been a Merdeka Award winner if not for the fact that he is widely acknowledged as one of the plantation industry’s towering figures.
He attained that stature as a pioneer, manager, innovator and fierce defender of the industry, all rolled into one. Among his other achievements was his leadership in building Tungud Estate in Sabah from scratch. The saga started in 1960, when oil palm was a brand new crop to the state.
Today, Sabah is Malaysia’s No.1 palm oil producer.
As the estate manager, he coaxed an oil palm plantation to take root in face of a litany of difficulties – primitive living conditions, malaria, boardroom opposition back in the London headquarters, engineering challenges, annual floods, the occasional episode of shocking violence, pest attacks, and the threat of piracy and the Indonesian Confrontation.
During his time in Sabah, he also befriended the state’s leading personalities such as politicians Tun Datuk Mustapha Datuk Harun and Tun Fuad Stephens.
Sabah stories
Davidson has documented many episodes of his life on this wild frontier in a book, East of Kinabalu, published last year by The Incorporated Society of Planters (ISP). It is a collection of often charming, witty, wistful and insightful anecdotes, and is populated by a gallery of colourful characters.
(A second edition was released recently. The book has been expanded to include eight new chapters that mostly cover Davidson’s years in Kluang.)
He says the book is meant to be an affectionate tribute to his old friends who were involved in the Tungud project. It is not great deeds that he wants to honour.
“It’s what they were, not what they did. I’m just telling it the way I saw it. These are people whom I admired. I’m trying to make known that the industry is not just about people who are singled out for awards,” he explains.
Indeed, apart from his family – wife Olive and daughters Catriona and Fiona soon joined him at the estate, and a third daughter, Mary Anne, was born in Sandakan in 1963 – people like Ibrahim Sulong (“blacksmith, medicine man and sturdy individualist”) and carpenter Kong Miew are key players in Davidson’s life in Sabah.
Plantation consultant and author Mahbob Abdullah once worked under Davidson. In his own book, Planter’s Tales, Mahbob teasingly describes his former boss as “dangerous” when he did not have enough to do. According to Mahbob, Davidson was “brash” and was a man with “many wild ideas”. How does he plead?
“Absolutely guilty,” says Davidson. “I think it’s basically dissatisfaction with what’s going on around me. I’m just a grumbling old banger. It’s a good thing to be dissatisfied.”
It is this state of mind that many times brings us to discoveries and improvements. It definitely works that way for Davidson.
“Let’s think about the oil palm. What a bloody stupid tree it is. Look at coconuts. They shed their fronds, don’t they? Free of charge. You don’t have to cut them off. With the oil palm, you have to spend money cutting off their fronds,” he points out.
“The oil palm doesn’t shed its fruits. The coconut drops its fruits nicely on the ground at your feet. You just pick them up. With the oil palm, you’ve got to cut them off.”
That sets the stage for his chief argument that the oil palm industry should focus on using technology to modify the tree so that it is easier and cheaper to harvest the trees and maintain the estates. And he believes that given the currently weak palm oil prices, now is the time to get back to basics.
Loving people, not palms
Then again, the plantation business is not all yields and ringgit and sen. It is more than likely that more people will remember Davidson for his friendship and warmth to others, than those who identify him as the man who brought the pollinating weevil to this part of the world.
As head of the Unilever plantation business in Malaysia, he stood out among the expatriate managers for refusing to participate in the somewhat exclusive ritual of the Sunday curry lunch.
He always sought interaction with the locals, and learnt enough Malay and Hakka to pass the ISP exams. He thinks this has to do with the fact that he grew up in Scotland during and after World War II. Also, he considers himself “slightly liberal”.
“I wasn’t really colonial-minded. In fact, it was a bit embarrassing sometimes. I admired a lot of the colonial officials. A lonely Englishman out in the jungle running a place in Africa the size of Europe is great, but it was never my attitude.”
As Tungud Estate manager, he oversaw a fast-growing community of many nationalities, races and religions. Towards the end of East of Kinabalu, he wrote that the estate and the other pioneering plantations in Sabah had provided a peaceful haven for thousands who had arrived there to escape poverty and conflicts.
He adds in the book, “I was personally far more proud of the contribution we had made towards this than of any impact we may have had on the agricultural development in the region.”
And he tells StarBizWeek, “I suppose planters are really divided into two – those who are very proud of the palm trees and those who are very interested in the people who look after the palm trees. To me, it was a great privilege to work as a planter because of all these interesting people, all of whom are great individuals.”
26 April 2009
25 April 2009
我认为的每ha生产成本。
几乎大家都在找每ha的生产成本的计算方式,我的意见是,没有一个方法能鉴别。
如果要简单的说,每ha的成本应该是肥料1600,人工800,运输800,其他800(总共是RM4000)。
因为每ha可以生产 4tons 重的cpo,所以每吨的生产成本是 RM1000。
这不是我随便说的,这是CIMB分析员说的。
Generally, fertiliser costs account for 40% of operating
costs. This is followed by labour (20%), transportation
(20%) and fixed overheads (20%).
如果说,最近的肥料涨了100%,油价涨了30%,那么,你就自己adjust。
如果没有记错,sarawak plantation的年报有介绍他们的成本分配,可读读。
说完了每ha成本,其实还有一个指标是很误导人的,那就是cost of production of per ton cpo (COPPTC)。
图片更正:COPPTC = (estate cost + ffb cost + mill cost) / (cpo output in tons)
COPPTC的计算方式必须包括暴利税,但不包括sabah/sarawak sales tax和palm kernel sales。
还有一种表达方式,就是cost of production of per ton of palm products
他的意思是,把CPO , PK , Palm Fatty Acid Distillate , palm fibre oil全部加起来的成本。
【amend : 应该没有算进 PK,必须确定palm products是什么先。
如果把refined oil products也算进去,就更高了】
每个经理的表达方式和标准都不一样,因此没有unified method。
以TSH的biomass 和 biogas 为例,他出售的碳配额(CERs),是不能扣在COPPTC里的,把“果壳燃料”用在refinery,也不关CPO的事,自然也就不关COPPTC的事了。
以Kurnia为例,Kurnia到目前为止,连一间提炼厂都没有,照理说他不会有pk和cpo selling price的(不会有COPPTC),但是他和彭亨州厂家关系良好,Kurnia“借用”了他们的设备,厂商允许Kurnia按市价售出CPO和PK。
【 add :Kurnia和他们签了长约,因此COPPTC扣了kernel sales。『source:2004年报(之后的method不知道)』 】
以上的标准,都是在我理解范围内,认为“对”的标准,不能作为市面上的标准。
还有一个方法,那就是profit per hectare。
必须说明一下,不要问我“什么公司的profit per hectare最高?”,“什么公司土地面积最大?” 之类的问题。很抱歉。
因为,理论说得简单,实践才是最难的。
我手上连一些最基本的数据都没有,例如“哪间种植公司pe最低”之类的数据。虽然我知道收集这些资料,比收集一些鸡毛蒜皮的数据更快,更直接,和更有效。
如果要简单的说,每ha的成本应该是肥料1600,人工800,运输800,其他800(总共是RM4000)。
因为每ha可以生产 4tons 重的cpo,所以每吨的生产成本是 RM1000。
这不是我随便说的,这是CIMB分析员说的。
Generally, fertiliser costs account for 40% of operating
costs. This is followed by labour (20%), transportation
(20%) and fixed overheads (20%).
如果说,最近的肥料涨了100%,油价涨了30%,那么,你就自己adjust。
如果没有记错,sarawak plantation的年报有介绍他们的成本分配,可读读。
说完了每ha成本,其实还有一个指标是很误导人的,那就是cost of production of per ton cpo (COPPTC)。
图片更正:COPPTC = (estate cost + ffb cost + mill cost) / (cpo output in tons)
COPPTC的计算方式必须包括暴利税,但不包括sabah/sarawak sales tax和palm kernel sales。
还有一种表达方式,就是cost of production of per ton of palm products
他的意思是,把CPO , PK , Palm Fatty Acid Distillate , palm fibre oil全部加起来的成本。
【amend : 应该没有算进 PK,必须确定palm products是什么先。
如果把refined oil products也算进去,就更高了】
每个经理的表达方式和标准都不一样,因此没有unified method。
以TSH的biomass 和 biogas 为例,他出售的碳配额(CERs),是不能扣在COPPTC里的,把“果壳燃料”用在refinery,也不关CPO的事,自然也就不关COPPTC的事了。
以Kurnia为例,Kurnia到目前为止,连一间提炼厂都没有,照理说他不会有pk和cpo selling price的(不会有COPPTC),但是他和彭亨州厂家关系良好,Kurnia“借用”了他们的设备,厂商允许Kurnia按市价售出CPO和PK。
【 add :Kurnia和他们签了长约,因此COPPTC扣了kernel sales。『source:2004年报(之后的method不知道)』 】
以上的标准,都是在我理解范围内,认为“对”的标准,不能作为市面上的标准。
还有一个方法,那就是profit per hectare。
必须说明一下,不要问我“什么公司的profit per hectare最高?”,“什么公司土地面积最大?” 之类的问题。很抱歉。
因为,理论说得简单,实践才是最难的。
我手上连一些最基本的数据都没有,例如“哪间种植公司pe最低”之类的数据。虽然我知道收集这些资料,比收集一些鸡毛蒜皮的数据更快,更直接,和更有效。
23 April 2009
tsh的印尼地价
原本是看着Asiatic的,但不知不觉参考了tsh的记录。
顺便整理了tsh近几年来,在印尼购买空地的记录。原本只列出两个的,但format一样,就弄完他。
picture source from tsh.com.my, 下同 ,上图中的面积是参考的。
PT Farinda Bersaudara 90%股权
seller:singapore company Sharecorp Limited
PT TEGUH SWAKARSA SEJAHTERA
seller:indonesia companies
TSH透过70%子公司买入PT TEGUH SWAKARSA SEJAHTERA
PT Mitra Jaya Cemerlang 90%股权
seller:singapore company Cova International Pte. Ltd.
需要注意的是,这块地皮还没有买到,但已经在tsh的网站公布了。
或许是他们已给了70%订金,答案等年报就好了。
P.T. Sarana Prima Multi Niaga 90%股权
seller:indonesians
60% PT ANDALAS WAHANA BERJAYA
于03年,以100多万马币买入一间占地27ha,45t/h的提炼厂,但tsh没有在网站中记录下来。
seller:related party
上述两项交易不明确,没有交代债务或nta,导致买价异常的低。
不必找年报。
PT. LARAS INTERNUSA
seller:indonesians
TSH透过70%子公司买入。
这地段距离kinali mill 13km。
kinali mill应该是自己承建的。
种植的新地开发成本,个人认为它可分为三个重点。
1)土地的潜质例如肥力,有没有树桐可砍。如果没有树桐,都是烂芭,就要花多RM1000的费用整修(与没有“翻种津贴”的翻种地比较)。
2)要不要安装灌溉系统,树苗向谁买。如果没有错,有禁令,种子和树苗不准带出国。
3)每间公司的每年开发成本都不一样,有的1000(如果年尾才开始算你也不知道),有的3000,有的5000,有的1万(因为他们把买地的价钱都算进去了),有的2万(把买地的钱和4年budget都算进去了,分析员没交代)。
由于之前我对asiatic持有特别悲观的偏见,本想写一篇颠覆的分析,但要求过高与能力不足,写不出东西,因此才有这一篇,也借此交代asiatic的事项。
asiatic也一直在扩大印尼土地面积,如有机会可拿来比较。
以上资料只能作为补助,tsh的买卖条件并不在于“一亩多少钱”这个问题上。
必须注意的是,我做的功课不多(不广),只是有点细而已,不等于我是了解他的。
记录,只是备不时之需,也许并不适合你。
并不是说懂得越多就能赚大钱,因为市场主流还是以看概念和看势为主。基本上,当你认为现在是牛时,买KLK和IOICORP其实都一样,根本不必计算他的地多少钱,他的pe是多少,哪个便宜。
顺便整理了tsh近几年来,在印尼购买空地的记录。原本只列出两个的,但format一样,就弄完他。
picture source from tsh.com.my, 下同 ,上图中的面积是参考的。
PT Farinda Bersaudara 90%股权
占地(ha) | 17,085 x 90% |
---|---|
栽种权(ha) | 13,303 x 90% |
买入时间 | 26/12/2008 |
申请栽种权历时 | 3年2月 |
买价 | USD4,540,513 |
买价/栽种权 | USD379.239 |
usd/myr | 3.52 |
seller:singapore company Sharecorp Limited
PT TEGUH SWAKARSA SEJAHTERA
占地(ha) | 17,000 |
---|---|
栽种权(ha) | 10,282 |
买入时间 | 24 March 2006 |
买价 | Rp. 24.2 billion |
买价/栽种权 | Rp. 2,353,628 |
myr/rupiah | 2480 |
seller:indonesia companies
TSH透过70%子公司买入PT TEGUH SWAKARSA SEJAHTERA
PT Mitra Jaya Cemerlang 90%股权
占地(ha) | 15,000 x 90% |
---|---|
栽种权(ha) | on the way |
proposal 时间 | 04 june 2008 |
买价 | USD5,737,500 |
买价/占地 | USD425 |
usd/myr | 3.23 |
seller:singapore company Cova International Pte. Ltd.
需要注意的是,这块地皮还没有买到,但已经在tsh的网站公布了。
或许是他们已给了70%订金,答案等年报就好了。
P.T. Sarana Prima Multi Niaga 90%股权
占地(ha) | 8,490 x 90% |
---|---|
栽种权(ha) | 7,100 x 90% |
planted(ha) | 6,000 x 90% |
买入时间 | 12/04/2007 |
买价 | USD25.2 million |
买价/planted | USD4,666.66 |
usd/myr | 3.52 |
seller:indonesians
60% PT ANDALAS WAHANA BERJAYA
于03年,以100多万马币买入一间占地27ha,45t/h的提炼厂,但tsh没有在网站中记录下来。
占地(ha) | 7,600 x 60% |
---|---|
栽种权(ha) | unknown |
买入时间 | 01/12/2004 |
买价 | Rp150,000,000 |
买价/占地 | Rp32,894 (约RM13) |
seller:related party
上述两项交易不明确,没有交代债务或nta,导致买价异常的低。
不必找年报。
PT. LARAS INTERNUSA
占地(ha) | unknown |
---|---|
栽种权(ha) | 7,000 |
planted(ha) | 4,200 |
买入时间 | 1 May 2006 |
买价 | Rps 85 billion |
买价/planted | Rps 20238095 |
myr/rupiah | 2540 |
seller:indonesians
TSH透过70%子公司买入。
这地段距离kinali mill 13km。
kinali mill应该是自己承建的。
种植的新地开发成本,个人认为它可分为三个重点。
1)土地的潜质例如肥力,有没有树桐可砍。如果没有树桐,都是烂芭,就要花多RM1000的费用整修(与没有“翻种津贴”的翻种地比较)。
2)要不要安装灌溉系统,树苗向谁买。如果没有错,有禁令,种子和树苗不准带出国。
3)每间公司的每年开发成本都不一样,有的1000(如果年尾才开始算你也不知道),有的3000,有的5000,有的1万(因为他们把买地的价钱都算进去了),有的2万(把买地的钱和4年budget都算进去了,分析员没交代)。
由于之前我对asiatic持有特别悲观的偏见,本想写一篇颠覆的分析,但要求过高与能力不足,写不出东西,因此才有这一篇,也借此交代asiatic的事项。
asiatic也一直在扩大印尼土地面积,如有机会可拿来比较。
以上资料只能作为补助,tsh的买卖条件并不在于“一亩多少钱”这个问题上。
必须注意的是,我做的功课不多(不广),只是有点细而已,不等于我是了解他的。
记录,只是备不时之需,也许并不适合你。
并不是说懂得越多就能赚大钱,因为市场主流还是以看概念和看势为主。基本上,当你认为现在是牛时,买KLK和IOICORP其实都一样,根本不必计算他的地多少钱,他的pe是多少,哪个便宜。
Indonesia may keep CPO export tax at zero pct in May
以下新闻是针对这篇博文<下个月的印尼出口税应该要重启了>,作出的修正。
Mari Pangestu 可能依旧(may keep) 保持0% 出口税,尽管cpo已经上涨。
Indonesia may keep CPO export tax at zero pct in May - minister
16/04/2009 - 05:44
JAKARTA, April 16 (Reuters) - Indonesia may keep its palm oil export tax at zero percent in May, despite a recent rise in palm oil prices, Trade Minister Mari Pangestu said on Thursday.
(Reporting by Yayat Supriatna; Writing by Aloysius Bhui; Editing by Sara Webb)
((aloysius.bhui@thomsonreuters.com; +62 213846364 ext 913; aloysius.bhui.reuters.com@reuters.net))
((If you have a query or comment on this story, send an email to
news.feedback.asia@thomsonreuters.com))
Keywords: PALMOIL INDONESIA/TAX
Mari Pangestu 可能依旧(may keep) 保持0% 出口税,尽管cpo已经上涨。
Indonesia may keep CPO export tax at zero pct in May - minister
16/04/2009 - 05:44
JAKARTA, April 16 (Reuters) - Indonesia may keep its palm oil export tax at zero percent in May, despite a recent rise in palm oil prices, Trade Minister Mari Pangestu said on Thursday.
(Reporting by Yayat Supriatna; Writing by Aloysius Bhui; Editing by Sara Webb)
((aloysius.bhui@thomsonreuters.com; +62 213846364 ext 913; aloysius.bhui.reuters.com@reuters.net))
((If you have a query or comment on this story, send an email to
news.feedback.asia@thomsonreuters.com))
Keywords: PALMOIL INDONESIA/TAX
22 April 2009
21 April 2009
tsh 的 hak guna usaha 应该是0。
tsh 的 hak guna usaha 应该是0。 (已栽种的地段(若有)不算)
hak guna usaha (HGU) 是印尼的land use for commercial right,也可以说是栽种许可证。
在印尼,如果要发展种植业,必须拿到两张permit,首先是izin lokasi(location permit),之后是HGU。
IL应该是地契之类的。
在TSH的年报中,TSH对HGU只字不提,原因相信是,他们没法取得许可证,如果想马上行动,就必须找当地的公司,和他们联营,由他们负责申请。
要取得HGU是相当困难的,R.E.A. 在申请HGU时,就耗费过3年的记录。
我刚读了过去有关tsh的分析报告,分析员也在隐瞒这个东西,他们只选择性的说izin lokasi。
当然,看完这个博文后,别胡乱猜测我的买卖建议,因为这不是卖出建议。
很多时候,当我对某公司持悲观意见时,反而手持了他的股票。
【amend later】
在19 June 2007,TSH以 RM16,205,474 的价格,从新加坡公司(Sharecorp Limited)手里买下了占地15000ha的公司--PT Farinda Bersaudara 的90%股权。 source
文告中有提到,如果Sharecorp没有办法申请到HGU,TSH只需要给70%的买价。
The total purchase consideration will be paid in stages with final payment of 30% to be made when HGU has been obtained.
但是这项交易一直拖延到26/12/2008才完成,卖主也换了一个名字,卖主终于等到印尼官方(Badan Pertanahan Nasional)的视察(Cadastral Survey),批准了占地13,303 ha的HGU。
申请HGU,等了3年多,从2005年算起。
我在发新稿时,没有注意到最新情况,只看了2007年年报,因此,原文和主题是错的,因为TSH已经拿到了HGU。
至于对分析员的“指责”,如果在26/12/2008以前TSH没有拿到任何的HGU,就可以成立。个人时间有限,掌握资料不够详细。有错见谅。
【end of amend】
hak guna usaha (HGU) 是印尼的land use for commercial right,也可以说是栽种许可证。
在印尼,如果要发展种植业,必须拿到两张permit,首先是izin lokasi(location permit),之后是HGU。
IL应该是地契之类的。
在TSH的年报中,TSH对HGU只字不提,原因相信是,他们没法取得许可证,如果想马上行动,就必须找当地的公司,和他们联营,由他们负责申请。
要取得HGU是相当困难的,R.E.A. 在申请HGU时,就耗费过3年的记录。
我刚读了过去有关tsh的分析报告,分析员也在隐瞒这个东西,他们只选择性的说izin lokasi。
当然,看完这个博文后,别胡乱猜测我的买卖建议,因为这不是卖出建议。
很多时候,当我对某公司持悲观意见时,反而手持了他的股票。
【amend later】
在19 June 2007,TSH以 RM16,205,474 的价格,从新加坡公司(Sharecorp Limited)手里买下了占地15000ha的公司--PT Farinda Bersaudara 的90%股权。 source
文告中有提到,如果Sharecorp没有办法申请到HGU,TSH只需要给70%的买价。
The total purchase consideration will be paid in stages with final payment of 30% to be made when HGU has been obtained.
但是这项交易一直拖延到26/12/2008才完成,卖主也换了一个名字,卖主终于等到印尼官方(Badan Pertanahan Nasional)的视察(Cadastral Survey),批准了占地13,303 ha的HGU。
申请HGU,等了3年多,从2005年算起。
我在发新稿时,没有注意到最新情况,只看了2007年年报,因此,原文和主题是错的,因为TSH已经拿到了HGU。
至于对分析员的“指责”,如果在26/12/2008以前TSH没有拿到任何的HGU,就可以成立。个人时间有限,掌握资料不够详细。有错见谅。
【end of amend】
20 April 2009
Businesses criticize cooking oil VAT cut
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/12/06/businesses-criticize-cooking-oil-vat-cut.html
印尼常制造一些税务漏洞,似乎有意无意闹粮食荒。
例如说现在的CPO出口税是0,但是国内的粮油却要给10%国内增值税(PPN/VAT),如果我是供应商,我会把CPO出口到国外去。
这种现象也发生在马来西亚,2008年年头,因为本地包装粮油有政府津贴(较便宜),厂商把市面上的粮油囤积起来拿回去工厂做一些另外用途。
印尼的贸易部长说他们考虑撤销VAT。其实已经讲很久了,如果你说他们换了三届总统和三届部长却还在讲同样的话,我一点都不奇怪。我当然不知道他们讲了多久,因为最近我才开始关注这类的问题。
一些东马种植公司说印尼比东马占有优势,不知是何缘故。因为贸易的优劣是很少发生偏差的,尤其是发生在两大生产国之间。
我是根据资料找到目前的cooking oil VAT依然是10%的,或许现在已经撤销了,说错见谅。
Mustaqim Adamrah, , The Jakarta Post, , Jakarta | Sat, 12/06/2008 11:40 AM | Business
Businesses gave a cold response to a government plan to waive value-added tax (VAT) on up to 50,000 liters of unbranded packaged cooking oil each year, dismissing the amount as "too small" for the subsidy.
The amount eligible for the subsidy was peanuts compared to the 80 million liters of unbranded cooking oil used each month by households and industry, Indonesian Vegetable Oil Producers Association (Gimni) executive director Sahat Sinaga said on Friday.
"Ideally, the government should waive the VAT on 50,000 tons of unbranded cooking oil per month if it really wants to reduce burdens on the community," Sahat said.
The government plans to waive VAT on several categories of goods including unbranded packaged cooking oil, to help keep prices in check, Trade Minister Mari Elka Pangestu said recently.
At present, unbranded cooking oils sell for between Rp 9,000 (75 US cents) and Rp 10,000 per kilogram.
"*Packaged* unbranded cooking oils eligible for the VAT cut are sold at traditional markets for prices within consumers' reach," Mari told members of House Commission VI (which oversees industry, trade, state-owned enterprises, cooperatives and small and medium enterprises).
The government plans to phase out sales of unpackaged cooking oils, which it hopes to replace with packaged unbranded cooking oils, Trade Ministry domestic trade director general Subagyo said recently.
"In future, we hope, unbranded packaged cooking oils will be slightly more expensive than unbranded unpackaged cooking oils, but cheaper than branded cooking oils," Subagyo said.
The unbranded packaged cooking oils the government plans to promote would be labeled Minyak Goreng Sawit or MGS (palm oil for cooking), Subagyo added.
In a bid to stabilize cooking oil prices, Sahat said, state logistics firm Bulog was working with businesses to market unbranded packaged cooking oils.
MGS cooking oil would be sold in 500-milliliter, 1-liter, 5-liter and 18-liter packages, said Indonesian Cooking Oil Industry Association chairman Adiwisoko Kasman (also involved in the marketing venture).
"We are now processing licenses with BPOM *Food and Drug Food Monitoring Agency* and MUI *Indonesian Ulema Council*, prior to the launch scheduled for January 2009," Adiwisoko said.
印尼常制造一些税务漏洞,似乎有意无意闹粮食荒。
例如说现在的CPO出口税是0,但是国内的粮油却要给10%国内增值税(PPN/VAT),如果我是供应商,我会把CPO出口到国外去。
这种现象也发生在马来西亚,2008年年头,因为本地包装粮油有政府津贴(较便宜),厂商把市面上的粮油囤积起来拿回去工厂做一些另外用途。
印尼的贸易部长说他们考虑撤销VAT。其实已经讲很久了,如果你说他们换了三届总统和三届部长却还在讲同样的话,我一点都不奇怪。我当然不知道他们讲了多久,因为最近我才开始关注这类的问题。
一些东马种植公司说印尼比东马占有优势,不知是何缘故。因为贸易的优劣是很少发生偏差的,尤其是发生在两大生产国之间。
我是根据资料找到目前的cooking oil VAT依然是10%的,或许现在已经撤销了,说错见谅。
Mustaqim Adamrah, , The Jakarta Post, , Jakarta | Sat, 12/06/2008 11:40 AM | Business
Businesses gave a cold response to a government plan to waive value-added tax (VAT) on up to 50,000 liters of unbranded packaged cooking oil each year, dismissing the amount as "too small" for the subsidy.
The amount eligible for the subsidy was peanuts compared to the 80 million liters of unbranded cooking oil used each month by households and industry, Indonesian Vegetable Oil Producers Association (Gimni) executive director Sahat Sinaga said on Friday.
"Ideally, the government should waive the VAT on 50,000 tons of unbranded cooking oil per month if it really wants to reduce burdens on the community," Sahat said.
The government plans to waive VAT on several categories of goods including unbranded packaged cooking oil, to help keep prices in check, Trade Minister Mari Elka Pangestu said recently.
At present, unbranded cooking oils sell for between Rp 9,000 (75 US cents) and Rp 10,000 per kilogram.
"*Packaged* unbranded cooking oils eligible for the VAT cut are sold at traditional markets for prices within consumers' reach," Mari told members of House Commission VI (which oversees industry, trade, state-owned enterprises, cooperatives and small and medium enterprises).
The government plans to phase out sales of unpackaged cooking oils, which it hopes to replace with packaged unbranded cooking oils, Trade Ministry domestic trade director general Subagyo said recently.
"In future, we hope, unbranded packaged cooking oils will be slightly more expensive than unbranded unpackaged cooking oils, but cheaper than branded cooking oils," Subagyo said.
The unbranded packaged cooking oils the government plans to promote would be labeled Minyak Goreng Sawit or MGS (palm oil for cooking), Subagyo added.
In a bid to stabilize cooking oil prices, Sahat said, state logistics firm Bulog was working with businesses to market unbranded packaged cooking oils.
MGS cooking oil would be sold in 500-milliliter, 1-liter, 5-liter and 18-liter packages, said Indonesian Cooking Oil Industry Association chairman Adiwisoko Kasman (also involved in the marketing venture).
"We are now processing licenses with BPOM *Food and Drug Food Monitoring Agency* and MUI *Indonesian Ulema Council*, prior to the launch scheduled for January 2009," Adiwisoko said.
19 April 2009
tsh 收购 Bisa Jaya
tsh 以1元代价,透过独资子公司收购 bisa jaya。
BISA JAYA SDN. BHD. (670404-A) 是一间负资本公司 (negative shareholders fund) ,
债务 21,532,368
资产 19,653,368
---------------
资本 -1,879,000
---------------
大股东为Lee Min Huat(99.999%)和 Lee Wai Kok(0.001%)
Lee Min Huat的相关公司是SCOPE INDUSTRIES BERHAD (mesdaq board)。(不排除同名不同人)
bisa jaya的资产,最主要是持有7.96%股权的非上市种植公司,但是交易所公报(bursa announcement)没有透露是什么公司。
委任的会计公司是Messrs Y.S. Koh & Co。
19,653,368 / 0.0796 =
这间种植公司,总资本应该是RM246,900,000,这不算小了,若以RM30000地价计,起码有8000公顷。
bisa jaya有7.96%股权,也就是637公顷。
以上分析是根据没有作假的情况计算的。
我没有把tsh列在观察名单中,因此不了解是否有假。这是看了这个博文作出的补充。
ECMLIBRA research把5000ha 写成 50ha。
BISA JAYA SDN. BHD. (670404-A) 是一间负资本公司 (negative shareholders fund) ,
债务 21,532,368
资产 19,653,368
---------------
资本 -1,879,000
---------------
大股东为Lee Min Huat(99.999%)和 Lee Wai Kok(0.001%)
Lee Min Huat的相关公司是SCOPE INDUSTRIES BERHAD (mesdaq board)。(不排除同名不同人)
bisa jaya的资产,最主要是持有7.96%股权的非上市种植公司,但是交易所公报(bursa announcement)没有透露是什么公司。
委任的会计公司是Messrs Y.S. Koh & Co。
19,653,368 / 0.0796 =
这间种植公司,总资本应该是RM246,900,000,这不算小了,若以RM30000地价计,起码有8000公顷。
bisa jaya有7.96%股权,也就是637公顷。
以上分析是根据没有作假的情况计算的。
我没有把tsh列在观察名单中,因此不了解是否有假。这是看了这个博文作出的补充。
ECMLIBRA research把5000ha 写成 50ha。
18 April 2009
下个月的印尼出口税应该要重启了。
根据鹿特丹港口的平均价,我相信下个月的印尼出口税不会再是0.
这个月鹿特丹港口的cpo价格,在600美元-725美元之间,相信印尼的5月份出口税可能落在2.5%到5%。
如果没有错,base price是根据上个月的20号-本月的19号计算的。
很巧的是,马来西亚政府“附顺民意”,提高的cpo的暴利税的有效价格至RM2500。
如果cpo能扳回RM3000,那真是“太好了”。有这个可能吗?
这个月鹿特丹港口的cpo价格,在600美元-725美元之间,相信印尼的5月份出口税可能落在2.5%到5%。
如果没有错,base price是根据上个月的20号-本月的19号计算的。
很巧的是,马来西亚政府“附顺民意”,提高的cpo的暴利税的有效价格至RM2500。
如果cpo能扳回RM3000,那真是“太好了”。有这个可能吗?
17 April 2009
国外的洪水猛兽商品,就快蚕食大马市场了?
我迟迟不敢进IOI,因为还有一些问题要解决。
1.RM7时buyback太多,可能是蓄意。
2.马股估值太高。
3.和citibank的交涉留下污点。
4.和某些reputable bank签了数额庞大的结构型远期外汇买卖(currency target redemption forward contract)。(这才是主题。)
我不敢小看这个计时炸弹,当然现在的规模还小,但几年后就会泛滥了。
虽然这里只谈种植,但如果他影响了决策,还是要提他一提的。
上篇博文曾说过,我不再找有关于CTRFC的资料,我在之后的确没有再找过了。但由于上篇的博文篇幅太多了,很多中途读到的资料没有办法全部发表在里面,
现在就把资料做更进一步的解释。
我本来以为,CTRFC的架构是建立在target redemption note的基础上的,但实际是两者的设计方式(意义)是完全不同的。
target redemption note是一种能保值的利息投资。
但CTRFC却是一个“可以让你破产,不能让你发达”的香港商品。
人们一定以为这种商品是从美国和欧洲来的,一定“稳”,其实他是从香港来的。
这是因为他的“设计蓝本”是从香港的结构性投机--accumulator,研发出来的。
他的游戏规则是,赢只能赢一倍(有顶限,且,一到顶限就作废),输就要输双倍(无底线)。
也就是说,购买这类的商品,必须同时认购一张call option和两张put option,而且这个put option好像是不能像股票一样卖出的,也就是说你的亏损是无限的。
call能作废,put就不能作废。
【add later,一共有四种组合,buy call,buy put,sell call,sell put,也许你会乱,但只要能懂我说什么就可以了。】
CTRFC的游戏规则也有类似的地方,但他是算monthly basis的,只比daily basis的商品(一种更危险的货币商品,不记得名字了)安全一点点。当然,accumulator也是daily basis的。
CTRFC的基本游戏规则:
假设说现在的美元换马币的汇率是3.5。
银行和你签了一份CTRFC,strike price是3.4。
如果月尾的汇率是3.5,银行赔你0.1。
如果月尾的汇率是3.6,银行赔你0.2。
如果月尾的汇率是3.7,银行赔你0.3。
如果月尾的汇率是3.8,银行还是赔你0.3。(限涨) (也可能银行照赔0.4,但合约累积总计不能赔超2.0,之类的。)
如果这个走势继续,到一个程度,合约将被作废。
如果月尾的汇率是3.3,你要赔银行双倍,0.2。
如果月尾的汇率是3.2,你要赔银行双倍,0.4。
合约不会因为你输钱而作废。
这类商品,马来西亚第一个签的应该是Ioicorp(应该是07年10月),第二个是symphony,第三个是sab。
至少知道symphony的strike price是3.2,但ioicorp和sab没有透露。
这不是什么值得怀疑的问题,但,我怀疑ioicorp和citibank签了这份合约,相信会越买越多。
重点是citibank,因为他们的关系相当特殊。
虽然不一定是和citibank卖的(可能是hsbc,德国,法国,苏格兰,荷兰银行。。。),但不可否认的是,这个洪水猛兽很快就会蚕食大马了。(除非国家银行把关游戏规则,不然。。。。。。。)
【add a day later】
需注意的是,有关于这个contract,我在五个月前作出的ioicorp分析是错的,因为我当时并不了解。
来重温这个图,这是从IOI的30 sept 2008 的季报截取出来的。
第一行和第三行的“赌注”,已经重叠了,而且是倒行逆施(违背)的。
eur/usd 和 usd/myr 同时购买,就等于你买了一份 eur/myr (可以offset), 根本不必买两份,因为两份赌注都是限涨不限跌,这不是加害?
管理层可能会辩解说,strike price 和 condition, package不同,所以才买两份?
“乱枪打鸟”在名义上是分散风险,实际上是买多输多。
明确的说,如果真的要替公司日常作业护盘,他是可以买其他商品的,哪怕是美国的天气期货。
既然有“赌”的成分在,就不能是护盘的借口了,因为你不是投资公司(如symphony house那样)。
【end of add】
1.RM7时buyback太多,可能是蓄意。
2.马股估值太高。
3.和citibank的交涉留下污点。
4.和某些reputable bank签了数额庞大的结构型远期外汇买卖(currency target redemption forward contract)。(这才是主题。)
我不敢小看这个计时炸弹,当然现在的规模还小,但几年后就会泛滥了。
虽然这里只谈种植,但如果他影响了决策,还是要提他一提的。
上篇博文曾说过,我不再找有关于CTRFC的资料,我在之后的确没有再找过了。但由于上篇的博文篇幅太多了,很多中途读到的资料没有办法全部发表在里面,
现在就把资料做更进一步的解释。
我本来以为,CTRFC的架构是建立在target redemption note的基础上的,但实际是两者的设计方式(意义)是完全不同的。
target redemption note是一种能保值的利息投资。
但CTRFC却是一个“可以让你破产,不能让你发达”的香港商品。
人们一定以为这种商品是从美国和欧洲来的,一定“稳”,其实他是从香港来的。
这是因为他的“设计蓝本”是从香港的结构性投机--accumulator,研发出来的。
他的游戏规则是,赢只能赢一倍(有顶限,且,一到顶限就作废),输就要输双倍(无底线)。
也就是说,购买这类的商品,必须同时认购一张call option和两张put option,而且这个put option好像是不能像股票一样卖出的,也就是说你的亏损是无限的。
call能作废,put就不能作废。
【add later,一共有四种组合,buy call,buy put,sell call,sell put,也许你会乱,但只要能懂我说什么就可以了。】
CTRFC的游戏规则也有类似的地方,但他是算monthly basis的,只比daily basis的商品(一种更危险的货币商品,不记得名字了)安全一点点。当然,accumulator也是daily basis的。
CTRFC的基本游戏规则:
假设说现在的美元换马币的汇率是3.5。
银行和你签了一份CTRFC,strike price是3.4。
如果月尾的汇率是3.5,银行赔你0.1。
如果月尾的汇率是3.6,银行赔你0.2。
如果月尾的汇率是3.7,银行赔你0.3。
如果月尾的汇率是3.8,银行还是赔你0.3。(限涨) (也可能银行照赔0.4,但合约累积总计不能赔超2.0,之类的。)
如果这个走势继续,到一个程度,合约将被作废。
如果月尾的汇率是3.3,你要赔银行双倍,0.2。
如果月尾的汇率是3.2,你要赔银行双倍,0.4。
合约不会因为你输钱而作废。
这类商品,马来西亚第一个签的应该是Ioicorp(应该是07年10月),第二个是symphony,第三个是sab。
至少知道symphony的strike price是3.2,但ioicorp和sab没有透露。
这不是什么值得怀疑的问题,但,我怀疑ioicorp和citibank签了这份合约,相信会越买越多。
重点是citibank,因为他们的关系相当特殊。
虽然不一定是和citibank卖的(可能是hsbc,德国,法国,苏格兰,荷兰银行。。。),但不可否认的是,这个洪水猛兽很快就会蚕食大马了。(除非国家银行把关游戏规则,不然。。。。。。。)
【add a day later】
需注意的是,有关于这个contract,我在五个月前作出的ioicorp分析是错的,因为我当时并不了解。
来重温这个图,这是从IOI的30 sept 2008 的季报截取出来的。
第一行和第三行的“赌注”,已经重叠了,而且是倒行逆施(违背)的。
eur/usd 和 usd/myr 同时购买,就等于你买了一份 eur/myr (可以offset), 根本不必买两份,因为两份赌注都是限涨不限跌,这不是加害?
管理层可能会辩解说,strike price 和 condition, package不同,所以才买两份?
“乱枪打鸟”在名义上是分散风险,实际上是买多输多。
明确的说,如果真的要替公司日常作业护盘,他是可以买其他商品的,哪怕是美国的天气期货。
既然有“赌”的成分在,就不能是护盘的借口了,因为你不是投资公司(如symphony house那样)。
【end of add】
15 April 2009
SAB的jan 09季报
续 《SOUTHERN ACIDS 进入多事之秋了吗?》,
SAB的报告出炉了,季亏损为-15,313,000,比我预期中来的好太多了,在外汇亏损方面,亏不多。
大体而言,SAB的亏损的原因是各项业务的表现不良好,并不是因为外汇亏损造成。
种植税前只赚30万,医疗税前亏损,制造部门则亏损加剧,股票投资单季减值RM743,880。。。。。。。
根据惯例,SAB的other operating expenses特别多是正常的,它不是外汇亏损造成。
细节。
1.印尼的开发成本付款(Advances for plasma project)。
需注意的地方是,plasma project只占了SAB的种植版图很小的位置。
这个project有点特别,SAB全权负责开发油棕园,成熟以后,SAB须把这些地段转让给plasma farmer,相关银行将根据市价付款给SAB。
盈利计算方式是:转让地段的账面值-开发成本付款
盈利计算应该是one-off(到期才算)的,也相信这个project是stage by stage转让的。
开发成本的账面值,是以印尼盾做为货币单位,所以我相信这一季他蒙受的一些货币亏损。
这是基于自己的推理,并没有明文说明,也可能我是错的。
由于账面加起来只有4百万,因此相信他最多只亏了几万(单季)。
有关于plasma project,如果有更精确资料,才可说明。
2.美元债务账面值。
USD 2,263,000 ,相等于马币8,061,938。
美元上涨对美元债务不利。
3.forward foreign exchange contracts (4月份的细节)
数额太小。只有RM3,430,613的exposure,目前的亏损settle price为RM5,000。
4. USD/MYR Target Redemption Forward(structure contract)
全名叫作dual currency target redemption forward contracts,相信在我们的准则和制度中并没有明确规定它要如何expose给大众知道。
这个contract对股东来说,名声并不好,因为游戏规则是银行设计的。(Ioicorp也签了一份)
可以假设,当usd/myr超过3.65时,银行将遵照差额赔钱给SAB,但最多只能赔一个顶额。可是当usd/myr跌破3.65时,SAB需赔偿双倍给银行,这是可能发生的,因为我们不知道游戏规则。
到目前为止,我还是认为SAB的管理层是“忠”的,所以我还是以正常的角度解释图中的内容,如有说错之处请包涵。
但如果是“忠”的就不会签这种合约(commission又高),所以前提是,他必须是“无辜”的。
以下都是【假设】:
【SAB和银行在1 april 09签了一份DCTRFC,内容规定,SAB需在每个月的月尾,以(6660000x3.65)马币,换取6660000美元的货币,共15次。(是15次还是16次,就不探讨了)
666x15=9990,所以我认为他是15次。
但这不是真的拿钱去换,而是SAB和银行之间做出的每月结算。结算方式(盈亏)可能是根据daily weighted,或可能是月尾当天结算。
如果每个月,usd/myr都在3.65以上,SAB就是accumulator of contract(盈余累计者),只要SAB达到一个limited gain,这份合约就会被作废。
但如果,usd/myr都在3.65以下,SAB在当月就需以(9990000x3.65)马币换取9990000美元的货币。
对于DCTRFC来说,如果strike price是在spot price以下,是有惩罚性的,我在这里假设,惩罚是notional amount的50%。
但SAB的最大亏损是RM41,000,000,因为他可以以这个代价取消合约。
意即,notional amount不是maximum exposure,他的背后可能有更大的泡沫。
问题是,我们不知道strike price是多少,他是3.65还是3.75?这合约公平吗?无人知晓。】
注,此合约无关jan 09季报,因为这是april签订的。
如果想更进一步了解这个contract“通常性”机制,需要找国外的一些term来做参考,但是,我不能因为这个issue浪费我的时间,这样就够了。
相信DCTRFC将会被泛滥使用。
5.股票投资
单季亏损为RM743,880。
SAB的报告出炉了,季亏损为-15,313,000,比我预期中来的好太多了,在外汇亏损方面,亏不多。
大体而言,SAB的亏损的原因是各项业务的表现不良好,并不是因为外汇亏损造成。
种植税前只赚30万,医疗税前亏损,制造部门则亏损加剧,股票投资单季减值RM743,880。。。。。。。
根据惯例,SAB的other operating expenses特别多是正常的,它不是外汇亏损造成。
细节。
date | usd/myr | myr/rupiah | |
---|---|---|---|
30/04/2007 | - | 2650.75 | |
31/07/2007 | - | 2649.09 | |
31/10/2007 | - | 2725.71 | |
31/01/2008 | - | 2860.71 | |
30/04/2008 | 3.16 | 2953.25 | |
31/07/2008 | 3.26 | 2799.50 | |
30/10/2008 | 3.53 | 3062.76 | |
31/01/2009 | 3.62 | 3193 | |
01/04/2009 | 3.65 | - | |
08/04/2009 | 3.59 | - | |
15/04/2009 | 3.60 | 3120.28 |
1.印尼的开发成本付款(Advances for plasma project)。
需注意的地方是,plasma project只占了SAB的种植版图很小的位置。
这个project有点特别,SAB全权负责开发油棕园,成熟以后,SAB须把这些地段转让给plasma farmer,相关银行将根据市价付款给SAB。
盈利计算方式是:转让地段的账面值-开发成本付款
盈利计算应该是one-off(到期才算)的,也相信这个project是stage by stage转让的。
开发成本的账面值,是以印尼盾做为货币单位,所以我相信这一季他蒙受的一些货币亏损。
这是基于自己的推理,并没有明文说明,也可能我是错的。
由于账面加起来只有4百万,因此相信他最多只亏了几万(单季)。
有关于plasma project,如果有更精确资料,才可说明。
2.美元债务账面值。
USD 2,263,000 ,相等于马币8,061,938。
美元上涨对美元债务不利。
3.forward foreign exchange contracts (4月份的细节)
数额太小。只有RM3,430,613的exposure,目前的亏损settle price为RM5,000。
4. USD/MYR Target Redemption Forward(structure contract)
全名叫作dual currency target redemption forward contracts,相信在我们的准则和制度中并没有明确规定它要如何expose给大众知道。
这个contract对股东来说,名声并不好,因为游戏规则是银行设计的。(Ioicorp也签了一份)
可以假设,当usd/myr超过3.65时,银行将遵照差额赔钱给SAB,但最多只能赔一个顶额。可是当usd/myr跌破3.65时,SAB需赔偿双倍给银行,这是可能发生的,因为我们不知道游戏规则。
到目前为止,我还是认为SAB的管理层是“忠”的,所以我还是以正常的角度解释图中的内容,如有说错之处请包涵。
但如果是“忠”的就不会签这种合约(commission又高),所以前提是,他必须是“无辜”的。
以下都是【假设】:
【SAB和银行在1 april 09签了一份DCTRFC,内容规定,SAB需在每个月的月尾,以(6660000x3.65)马币,换取6660000美元的货币,共15次。(是15次还是16次,就不探讨了)
666x15=9990,所以我认为他是15次。
但这不是真的拿钱去换,而是SAB和银行之间做出的每月结算。结算方式(盈亏)可能是根据daily weighted,或可能是月尾当天结算。
如果每个月,usd/myr都在3.65以上,SAB就是accumulator of contract(盈余累计者),只要SAB达到一个limited gain,这份合约就会被作废。
但如果,usd/myr都在3.65以下,SAB在当月就需以(9990000x3.65)马币换取9990000美元的货币。
对于DCTRFC来说,如果strike price是在spot price以下,是有惩罚性的,我在这里假设,惩罚是notional amount的50%。
但SAB的最大亏损是RM41,000,000,因为他可以以这个代价取消合约。
意即,notional amount不是maximum exposure,他的背后可能有更大的泡沫。
问题是,我们不知道strike price是多少,他是3.65还是3.75?这合约公平吗?无人知晓。】
注,此合约无关jan 09季报,因为这是april签订的。
如果想更进一步了解这个contract“通常性”机制,需要找国外的一些term来做参考,但是,我不能因为这个issue浪费我的时间,这样就够了。
相信DCTRFC将会被泛滥使用。
5.股票投资
单季亏损为RM743,880。
kulim的肥料成本
根据kulim 向osk 的透露,kulim在马来西亚园丘的2009年肥料成本,已锁定在RM73,000,000(相对于去年的RM76,000,000)。
平均价格为RM2100/每公吨。
kulim的马来西亚园丘,总面积为35,261公顷(+未成熟),也就是说,每公顷的肥料成本为RM2070。
虽然这与我之前应用的RM1000/每公顷相差了100%,但在时间的推移下,还是符合了理想值。
记得kulim已把每棵树10kg的肥料用量减低至8kg,这是由于他们善用了POME(提炼厂残余)(Source: Golden Agri/OSK Research)。
如果没有这种设施,厂商也可以把果壳当生物燃料。
平均价格为RM2100/每公吨。
kulim的马来西亚园丘,总面积为35,261公顷(+未成熟),也就是说,每公顷的肥料成本为RM2070。
虽然这与我之前应用的RM1000/每公顷相差了100%,但在时间的推移下,还是符合了理想值。
记得kulim已把每棵树10kg的肥料用量减低至8kg,这是由于他们善用了POME(提炼厂残余)(Source: Golden Agri/OSK Research)。
如果没有这种设施,厂商也可以把果壳当生物燃料。
13 April 2009
SOUTHERN ACIDS 进入多事之秋了吗?
【add: 这是SAB母公司(或许是相关公司)的网址】
SAB给人的评价是“小而美”。
原产品的攀升,也让他“贵来贵卖”了好一段时间。
但从2008年8,9月以来,许多oleochemical/manufacturing-based companies也像SAB一样,在原产品暴跌期间蒙受了很大程度的亏损(多为存货亏损)。
这个缓冲期很快就能渡过,随着原产品又从谷底慢慢攀升,现在正是累计这类股票的时候,不管你处在什么领域。
要如何形容sab的公司营业状况?
有点像kseng 和 thgroup。
他从事的是油脂,种植,港口仓库租借和运输,小型医院,股票投资,而且每样都赚钱。
SAB也是一间派息率高的净现金公司,即使是亏损的季度也能有股息派发。以下是5年的financial highlight。
在最近的季报中(31/10/2008),现金部分为RM86,920,294,比半年前增加了1倍,其中最大部分的原因是,他在2008年5月-7月期间,抛售了RM12,298,073的股票,成本约为8,000,000(净赚5百万)。
虽然说oleochemical部门在8-10月期间亏了不少,但他们的银根紧缩使现金增加了。
在种植业务方面,SAB的园丘在印尼经营,如果没有看错,应该有8000公顷,和800公顷正在开发,由于这些印尼园丘是和印尼政府签订的,名称叫做Plasma project。
在还没有搞懂这个project以前,我不能够充分分析出东西来。
但,最重要的是,种植部门是有赚钱的,2007财政年度赚了11,000,000,2008财政年度赚了22,000,000。
而在2009年5月-10月的六个月里,赚了4,516,000,退步。
我们一般上以为,SAB投入印尼种植业,是为了补助oleochemical部门的原料来源,其实,两者并不相干。因为SAB是向本地拿货的,我猜测。
讲了这么多,还没进入主题。
很明显的,我没讲到31/01/2009的情况。
因为到目前为止,31/01/2009的报告流产了。
根据董事的说明,他们无法评估foreign exchange losses and contracts的真实数目,要请独立单位评估。
预计报告会在14 April 2009(明天)公布。
更糟糕的是,Banting Hock Hin Estate在27 march 2009,动议开除两名董事,分别是Yap Soon Nam 和 Haji Mohd Hisham Bin Harun ,刚好这两人都是2/5的查账委员会(audit commitee)的成员,但问题在于audit commitee共有5位成员,难道没有一个人有能力报告外汇亏损的细节?
Banting Hock Hin Estate其实是LOW X X的相关公司。
以SAB的股票挂价来看(1.24 1.44),是个死庄。如果它能够挂在1.25给你吃,也不能吃,应该等到事情明朗以后才吃,哪怕是RM1.5。
这个建议和我的利益无关,因为我不打算持有他。
有言在前,如果“5月大熊”之论调降临,我也无能为力,
SAB给人的评价是“小而美”。
原产品的攀升,也让他“贵来贵卖”了好一段时间。
但从2008年8,9月以来,许多oleochemical/manufacturing-based companies也像SAB一样,在原产品暴跌期间蒙受了很大程度的亏损(多为存货亏损)。
这个缓冲期很快就能渡过,随着原产品又从谷底慢慢攀升,现在正是累计这类股票的时候,不管你处在什么领域。
要如何形容sab的公司营业状况?
有点像kseng 和 thgroup。
他从事的是油脂,种植,港口仓库租借和运输,小型医院,股票投资,而且每样都赚钱。
SAB也是一间派息率高的净现金公司,即使是亏损的季度也能有股息派发。以下是5年的financial highlight。
在最近的季报中(31/10/2008),现金部分为RM86,920,294,比半年前增加了1倍,其中最大部分的原因是,他在2008年5月-7月期间,抛售了RM12,298,073的股票,成本约为8,000,000(净赚5百万)。
虽然说oleochemical部门在8-10月期间亏了不少,但他们的银根紧缩使现金增加了。
在种植业务方面,SAB的园丘在印尼经营,如果没有看错,应该有8000公顷,和800公顷正在开发,由于这些印尼园丘是和印尼政府签订的,名称叫做Plasma project。
在还没有搞懂这个project以前,我不能够充分分析出东西来。
但,最重要的是,种植部门是有赚钱的,2007财政年度赚了11,000,000,2008财政年度赚了22,000,000。
而在2009年5月-10月的六个月里,赚了4,516,000,退步。
我们一般上以为,SAB投入印尼种植业,是为了补助oleochemical部门的原料来源,其实,两者并不相干。因为SAB是向本地拿货的,我猜测。
讲了这么多,还没进入主题。
很明显的,我没讲到31/01/2009的情况。
因为到目前为止,31/01/2009的报告流产了。
根据董事的说明,他们无法评估foreign exchange losses and contracts的真实数目,要请独立单位评估。
预计报告会在14 April 2009(明天)公布。
更糟糕的是,Banting Hock Hin Estate在27 march 2009,动议开除两名董事,分别是Yap Soon Nam 和 Haji Mohd Hisham Bin Harun ,刚好这两人都是2/5的查账委员会(audit commitee)的成员,但问题在于audit commitee共有5位成员,难道没有一个人有能力报告外汇亏损的细节?
Banting Hock Hin Estate其实是LOW X X的相关公司。
以SAB的股票挂价来看(1.24 1.44),是个死庄。如果它能够挂在1.25给你吃,也不能吃,应该等到事情明朗以后才吃,哪怕是RM1.5。
这个建议和我的利益无关,因为我不打算持有他。
有言在前,如果“5月大熊”之论调降临,我也无能为力,
12 April 2009
ester,fatty acid, alcohol, FFA, esterification, transesterification.
ester
脂,fat/oil。
它是由fatty acid和alcohol串联在一起的,形成一个稳定的分子式。
fatty acid
种类有lauric acid,myristic acid,palmitic acid。
CPO有最多的palmitic acid。
alcohol
醇类。
种类有glycerol,methanol,ethanol。
如果没有错的话,CPO的主要成分是palmitic acid + glycerol,因此,CPO是ester的一种,这样的概念简单吧?
free fatty acid
游离脂肪酸,是指fatty acid从ester中脱离,变成“自由”的fatty acid。
造成原因之一是食油的过度使用。
这些过度使用的油(高FFA值),要经过多一个“步骤”才能把这些FFA去除。可能这个步骤的成本过高,因此本地的生柴生产商只用纯度较高的CPO提炼生柴。况且本地也没有这种机制,实施废油回收。
这个步骤可以是esterification(把FFA还原为ester),也可以是把FFA去除,具体步骤不详。
transesterification
是把一种ester转换成另一种ester的过程。
以下是transesterification的例子。
CPO + methanol ----> Palmitic Acid Methyl Ester(生柴) + glycerine
在这个转换过程中,methanol 取代 glycerol 的位置。
glycerine为副产品。
methanol有毒性,因此非工业领域的生柴提炼,也常用高纯度酒精(ethanol)制作生柴。
【add : 可参考这个carotec的图,但我不是想提起carotec。】
脂,fat/oil。
它是由fatty acid和alcohol串联在一起的,形成一个稳定的分子式。
fatty acid
种类有lauric acid,myristic acid,palmitic acid。
CPO有最多的palmitic acid。
alcohol
醇类。
种类有glycerol,methanol,ethanol。
如果没有错的话,CPO的主要成分是palmitic acid + glycerol,因此,CPO是ester的一种,这样的概念简单吧?
free fatty acid
游离脂肪酸,是指fatty acid从ester中脱离,变成“自由”的fatty acid。
造成原因之一是食油的过度使用。
这些过度使用的油(高FFA值),要经过多一个“步骤”才能把这些FFA去除。可能这个步骤的成本过高,因此本地的生柴生产商只用纯度较高的CPO提炼生柴。况且本地也没有这种机制,实施废油回收。
这个步骤可以是esterification(把FFA还原为ester),也可以是把FFA去除,具体步骤不详。
transesterification
是把一种ester转换成另一种ester的过程。
以下是transesterification的例子。
CPO + methanol ----> Palmitic Acid Methyl Ester(生柴) + glycerine
在这个转换过程中,methanol 取代 glycerol 的位置。
glycerine为副产品。
methanol有毒性,因此非工业领域的生柴提炼,也常用高纯度酒精(ethanol)制作生柴。
【add : 可参考这个carotec的图,但我不是想提起carotec。】
10 April 2009
bldplnt kabang estate
感谢一位博客在网上提供了一个照片。
这个照片说明了,bldplnt的木材子公司bintulu lumber,砍了树以后就拍拍屁股走人了,牌子挂上oil palm plantation只是名义上形式而已,看来这个division 1的地不值钱,因为都是水。
如果根据目测,这片水地应该有154公顷,这是根据远处树的情况大略测出的。
如果远处的树是油棕树,又是bldplnt种的,就怕是烂地。
如果没有错,这个应该属于mukah省的地段。
Lassa和Kabang占了bldplnt一半的地皮,总面积为21,805ha。
这个照片说明了,bldplnt的木材子公司bintulu lumber,砍了树以后就拍拍屁股走人了,牌子挂上oil palm plantation只是名义上形式而已,看来这个division 1的地不值钱,因为都是水。
如果根据目测,这片水地应该有154公顷,这是根据远处树的情况大略测出的。
如果远处的树是油棕树,又是bldplnt种的,就怕是烂地。
如果没有错,这个应该属于mukah省的地段。
Lassa和Kabang占了bldplnt一半的地皮,总面积为21,805ha。
pelita在sarawak的地位。
pelita holdings是直属砂拉越政府的单位,NCR(土著保留地)的土地征用权也需经过他的手。
也就是说,如果有任何的油棕种植活动涉及到NCR,都必须经过pelita,这个情况就像,如果有任何的桥需搭建,都必须给白毛。
应该有这样的明文规定:
如果在NCR从事种植活动,必须给pelita40%股权,自己60%。
股息(如有)的25%需分给当地的地主。
这也是为什么native land不值钱的原因了,但,赚还是有的赚。
至于有没有25%股息这种美事,不敢去想。
可以很确定的说,白毛想在哪里砍树,就砍哪里,LCDA和SLSD这两个单位会以“合法”的手续完成工作,一般上地主是不知道情况的。
上市的种植公司和pelita联营的有不少,Ioicorp,swkplnt,harnlen,KTS(启德行),TH。。。。。。
他们有没有派出25%的股息给当地地主?
也就是说,如果有任何的油棕种植活动涉及到NCR,都必须经过pelita,这个情况就像,如果有任何的桥需搭建,都必须给白毛。
应该有这样的明文规定:
如果在NCR从事种植活动,必须给pelita40%股权,自己60%。
股息(如有)的25%需分给当地的地主。
这也是为什么native land不值钱的原因了,但,赚还是有的赚。
至于有没有25%股息这种美事,不敢去想。
可以很确定的说,白毛想在哪里砍树,就砍哪里,LCDA和SLSD这两个单位会以“合法”的手续完成工作,一般上地主是不知道情况的。
上市的种植公司和pelita联营的有不少,Ioicorp,swkplnt,harnlen,KTS(启德行),TH。。。。。。
他们有没有派出25%的股息给当地地主?
09 April 2009
什么是underplanting?
在成熟的树中间种幼树,叫做underplanting。
但我的理解是,以上的情况不适合用在油棕。
我的理解是这样的(可能是错的)
在未成熟的树苗群里,有的树苗被淘汰后必须重植,之后,这些重植的树赶不上列入“成熟”的行列,因此只能列入underplanting的行列。
但,因为该地段已经被列入“成熟幼树”(young mature)的组合中了,因此所有的underplanting都必须列入young mature的行列中,所以我们看不到幼树的淘汰率(重植率)。
underplanting和immature的意义有些不同。
但我的理解是,以上的情况不适合用在油棕。
我的理解是这样的(可能是错的)
在未成熟的树苗群里,有的树苗被淘汰后必须重植,之后,这些重植的树赶不上列入“成熟”的行列,因此只能列入underplanting的行列。
但,因为该地段已经被列入“成熟幼树”(young mature)的组合中了,因此所有的underplanting都必须列入young mature的行列中,所以我们看不到幼树的淘汰率(重植率)。
underplanting和immature的意义有些不同。
无头公案
(tws,4421)借助庞大的资本,符合了Securities Commission最低的限度,在没有买卖细节的情况下收购了MASRETUS OIL PALM PLANTATION SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 758699-K) ,收购价为RM7,208,600.00。
MASRETUS的大股东依次为
i) Dato' Ibrahim bin Mahmud 35,000 35
ii) Yahya bin Ibrahim 19,400 19.4
iii) Neolita binti Yusuff 22,000 22
iv) Hayati binti Ahim 23,000 23
v) Mahmud bin Ibrahim 600 0.6
Masretus is currently the registered holder of a provisional lease over all those parcel of land with an aggregate of 768 hectares (1867 acres), situated at Pasai Siong Land District, in Sibu, Sarawak.
Masretus没有任何债务,因此每公顷的要价是RM9386.20,但他没有说有多少的地是有价值和有种植的。
Masretus的盈利记录,只字不提。
Masretus没有任何债务,是不是说Masretus不曾亏损?
如果付钱给商业注册局查Masretus的帐就算了。
大股东多是商界人士,多很有来头。
为什么tws不通过twsplnt收购呢?反正程序都一样。
又是Sibu,我对Sibu的评价不高。虽然我不知道Sibu多大,但感觉就是不好。
MASRETUS的大股东依次为
i) Dato' Ibrahim bin Mahmud 35,000 35
ii) Yahya bin Ibrahim 19,400 19.4
iii) Neolita binti Yusuff 22,000 22
iv) Hayati binti Ahim 23,000 23
v) Mahmud bin Ibrahim 600 0.6
Masretus is currently the registered holder of a provisional lease over all those parcel of land with an aggregate of 768 hectares (1867 acres), situated at Pasai Siong Land District, in Sibu, Sarawak.
Masretus没有任何债务,因此每公顷的要价是RM9386.20,但他没有说有多少的地是有价值和有种植的。
Masretus的盈利记录,只字不提。
Masretus没有任何债务,是不是说Masretus不曾亏损?
如果付钱给商业注册局查Masretus的帐就算了。
大股东多是商界人士,多很有来头。
为什么tws不通过twsplnt收购呢?反正程序都一样。
又是Sibu,我对Sibu的评价不高。虽然我不知道Sibu多大,但感觉就是不好。
07 April 2009
leweko已经技术破产(时间问题)
leweko最珍贵的资产是油棕园,分别注册在三家公司中(KPSB,SASB,PSB),近几年的产量最高记录达到32公吨果串/每公顷。如果找中立的估价师估价,最少值70,000,000(7千万)。leweko所以能站在30sen-40sen,可说是他们的关系。
但这三家公司在30 march 09,提议出售,售价是RM35,654,050。
其余的木材业资产已经是夕阳资产(因为他不是张老板),因此技术上他已经破产了。
派息的可能性是2%,壮大夕阳资产的可能性是98%。leweko说plantation不是他们的core,因此有充足理由相信,脱售种植业是为了壮大夕阳工业。
这三家公司的2007年的税后盈利总和是831万。(根据Bursa公报)
2008年的税后盈利总和是675万。(根据个人目测)
照理说2008年的盈利应该大幅提高的,但leweko说成本提高了,另一因素相信是平均销售只增加了20%(根据个人目测,报告没报。)
是项买卖是mutually agree的,也就是双方认同的价格,没有通过估价师算过。
他的股价不会因为市场怨声四起马上下跌,反而可能因特别收益和配合“木材题材”的炒作走高,所以不必担心唱坏声音。但,在时间问题上,迟早。
但这三家公司在30 march 09,提议出售,售价是RM35,654,050。
其余的木材业资产已经是夕阳资产(因为他不是张老板),因此技术上他已经破产了。
派息的可能性是2%,壮大夕阳资产的可能性是98%。leweko说plantation不是他们的core,因此有充足理由相信,脱售种植业是为了壮大夕阳工业。
这三家公司的2007年的税后盈利总和是831万。(根据Bursa公报)
2008年的税后盈利总和是675万。(根据个人目测)
照理说2008年的盈利应该大幅提高的,但leweko说成本提高了,另一因素相信是平均销售只增加了20%(根据个人目测,报告没报。)
是项买卖是mutually agree的,也就是双方认同的价格,没有通过估价师算过。
他的股价不会因为市场怨声四起马上下跌,反而可能因特别收益和配合“木材题材”的炒作走高,所以不必担心唱坏声音。但,在时间问题上,迟早。
06 April 2009
R.E.A. holdings plc
besides bourse in malaysia,singapore, and indonesia, still have a small numbers of oil palm player list in london stock exchange. one of the dig out gem(contrary to hidden gem) is NBPOL (subsidiary of kulim bhd), other one is tiny player-Narborough Plantations PLC (Rview related company).
apart from above, let me introduce a bright star oil palm player listed in London Stock Exchange.
R.E.A. Holdings plc is indonesia-based plantation company ,80's in North Sumatra , in 1989, exit North Sumatra entirely , and start a new life in East Kalimantan.
in year 2007, R.E.A. made a extremely well in their plantation performance make all the bolehland planter jealous.
source from R.E.A. annual report
Ioi corporation's selected figure from july cy03 to june cy08
from the comparison above, no one win in this struggle, and remind that the results of extraction rate is in line with overall collected crop, but coincidentally the milling scale of them are same, just marginally enough cater to own use.
according to the R.E.A management prudent forecast, ffb production target to 421000tons in year 2008 . and yes, this target was conclusively achieved in the 1st half of 2008 report(1H08) released in the end August of 2008, totalled to 231120tons on the half way, even though this is negate by periodic low yield factor, undoubtedly, the full year target is achievable with no sweat.
after i work out some comparison, found that the "profit per hectare" from R.E.A. make twice money than some Bolehland companies.
the following is the figure of plantation segment from IOI Corporation which is the best plantation company widely known.
The figure is based on calander year ,not fiscal year.
currency is MYR (000)
the above profit is arisen from operating performance before(exclude) taxation ,financing cost, other income, exception income ,and unallocated expenses (i should place some but no idea) , and after(include) marketing and administration expenses.
i will make the same with R.E.A.
the above figure of "Net gain from revalued inventory" is not allowed in malaysia accounting standard (write profit in advance), hence i don't take in comparison, there is no denying that this is handicap game for R.E.A , if R.E.A able to clear inventory, you can write back the gain.
the REA is above 600pence made on May 2008.
compare to today, the price quote at 255.50p.
the number of ordinary shares is 32,574,000, which represent to USD123.533 millions in mkt cap, after deducting 30% tax by indonesia and deducting small amount of preference share dividend, R.E.A still able to trade low at 3.79 pe ratio (based on conservative forecast eps of 1 US dollar in year 2008.)
is it truth?
R.E.A. aggresively expand land in recent year, thought that the completion of acquisition of two estate made in July 2008 should believed a overcharging deal compare to the CPO prospect at that time, but this is all my conjecture.
another issue should pay close attention is feasibility of venturing into coal milling business schemed by management.
at least we can prove how R.E.A holdings playing well in estate work, this is ironic fable for the incompetent company those who bitterly retreat from indonesia such as boustead holdings, they are distorting and evasive ,too many excuse for their behaviour.
i suppose some of the malaysian company overcharge their cost in venture into indonesia, such as umcca(but project about), orient holdings, asiatic, and chintek-nsop JV.
apart from above, let me introduce a bright star oil palm player listed in London Stock Exchange.
R.E.A. Holdings plc is indonesia-based plantation company ,80's in North Sumatra , in 1989, exit North Sumatra entirely , and start a new life in East Kalimantan.
in year 2007, R.E.A. made a extremely well in their plantation performance make all the bolehland planter jealous.
year | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ffb/hectare | 29.6 | 25.5 | 23.8 | 22.4 | 16.8 |
extraction % | 23.7 | 23.2 | 23.4 | 24.3 | 24.9 |
- | |||||
mature | 13080 | 13080 | 13085 | 13142 | 13234 |
Immature | 13328 | 11814 | 5250 | 3000 | 0 |
- | |||||
ffb produce | 393217 | 334076 | 313355 | 293883 | 222713 |
source from R.E.A. annual report
Ioi corporation's selected figure from july cy03 to june cy08
fiscal year | 08 | 07 | 06 | 05 | 04 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ffb/hectare | 28.54 | 26.72 | 26.93 | 27.57 | 23.91 |
extraction % | 21.38 | 21.33 | 21.38 | 21.59 | 21.54 |
from the comparison above, no one win in this struggle, and remind that the results of extraction rate is in line with overall collected crop, but coincidentally the milling scale of them are same, just marginally enough cater to own use.
according to the R.E.A management prudent forecast, ffb production target to 421000tons in year 2008 . and yes, this target was conclusively achieved in the 1st half of 2008 report(1H08) released in the end August of 2008, totalled to 231120tons on the half way, even though this is negate by periodic low yield factor, undoubtedly, the full year target is achievable with no sweat.
after i work out some comparison, found that the "profit per hectare" from R.E.A. make twice money than some Bolehland companies.
the following is the figure of plantation segment from IOI Corporation which is the best plantation company widely known.
The figure is based on calander year ,not fiscal year.
currency is MYR (000)
the above profit is arisen from operating performance before(exclude) taxation ,financing cost, other income, exception income ,and unallocated expenses (i should place some but no idea) , and after(include) marketing and administration expenses.
i will make the same with R.E.A.
the above figure of "Net gain from revalued inventory" is not allowed in malaysia accounting standard (write profit in advance), hence i don't take in comparison, there is no denying that this is handicap game for R.E.A , if R.E.A able to clear inventory, you can write back the gain.
the REA is above 600pence made on May 2008.
compare to today, the price quote at 255.50p.
the number of ordinary shares is 32,574,000, which represent to USD123.533 millions in mkt cap, after deducting 30% tax by indonesia and deducting small amount of preference share dividend, R.E.A still able to trade low at 3.79 pe ratio (based on conservative forecast eps of 1 US dollar in year 2008.)
is it truth?
R.E.A. aggresively expand land in recent year, thought that the completion of acquisition of two estate made in July 2008 should believed a overcharging deal compare to the CPO prospect at that time, but this is all my conjecture.
another issue should pay close attention is feasibility of venturing into coal milling business schemed by management.
at least we can prove how R.E.A holdings playing well in estate work, this is ironic fable for the incompetent company those who bitterly retreat from indonesia such as boustead holdings, they are distorting and evasive ,too many excuse for their behaviour.
i suppose some of the malaysian company overcharge their cost in venture into indonesia, such as umcca(but project about), orient holdings, asiatic, and chintek-nsop JV.
标签:
bstead,
chintek,
genp(asiatic),
ioicorp,
kulim,
nsop,
orient,
R.E.A. holdings,
rview
05 April 2009
用新的modulus评估,看看准不准确。
在上篇博文中,搬出了一个股息率的table,来给UNICO量身定做合理价,这有点硬套,但这只是我观察中小型股的心得,对不对还需经过反复测试。如果是错的,可以改正,可以找借口,可以放弃。
看看这张图片,大致上和我心里想的modulus有90%相近。
图中有三只股,分别是UNICO,KRETAM,IOICORP。
第一个table说的是种植面积的估值。
上一篇博文,有个网友问我要怎么计算地价,其实我不知道,所以这要靠你自己的感觉填写了。
UNICO并没有透露他的age profile(或许我没找到),虽然他的产量很高,原本应该给他RM50000的,基于安全,我给了他RM40000。
Kretam的地在sabah,潜能可能很大,即使产量还不达标准,但我给他RM55000。
当中的marketability,指的是average selling price和cost effectiveness的分数,我给UNICO的标准的100%,IOI 120%,Kretam是80%,因为Kretam的盈利需要和债主分享,赚幅折扣。
如果有间公司售出的CPO低于市价,种植成本又高,给这种人管理公司,即使地再漂亮也没有用处,可给他40%,如果CPO一举冲破RM4000,影响就不会那么大。
第二个table说的是提炼设施,食油设施,棕仁油设施,每年的种子销售,这个评估很困难,所以放弃,或根据年报的资料(如有),算出合理价,最方便的办法是根据balance sheet asset填写。
第三个table不叙述。
第四个table。
把三组加起来。
评估这间公司是不是被市场关注的“大”公司。
如果这间公司是冷门股,就填“不是”,进入下一行评估,根据股息率填写股价的“动力(momentum)”系数。
因为近两年UNICO的股息率是75%,所以他的动力是75%。
Kretam不符合派息条件,所以他这两三年内都会是一滩烂泥,动力是30%。除非他被市场关注,或能恢复派息率,几时,不懂。
在马来西亚以外的市场,可斟酌。
第五个table(per share valuation),是方便你计算每股价值的。
最后的阶段,是你自己的心态阶段,如果你觉得这个modulus不能用,可斟酌。
如果你想“玩玩看”这个modulus,这里有个链接下载,试试看。我没把握,天底下没绝对的事。
【edit later:如果是Joint venture,non-wholly-owned land,可按股权调整。
如果你认为unico的地价值RM50000,他的ideal price就是61sen,正好在评估线上,RM40000只是示范而已。
marketability可以想象成,这个管理者值不值得信赖,如果他经营的手法比你经营得更好,你就给他120%甚至可以是150%,答案就是screaming buy了】
看看这张图片,大致上和我心里想的modulus有90%相近。
图中有三只股,分别是UNICO,KRETAM,IOICORP。
第一个table说的是种植面积的估值。
上一篇博文,有个网友问我要怎么计算地价,其实我不知道,所以这要靠你自己的感觉填写了。
UNICO并没有透露他的age profile(或许我没找到),虽然他的产量很高,原本应该给他RM50000的,基于安全,我给了他RM40000。
Kretam的地在sabah,潜能可能很大,即使产量还不达标准,但我给他RM55000。
当中的marketability,指的是average selling price和cost effectiveness的分数,我给UNICO的标准的100%,IOI 120%,Kretam是80%,因为Kretam的盈利需要和债主分享,赚幅折扣。
如果有间公司售出的CPO低于市价,种植成本又高,给这种人管理公司,即使地再漂亮也没有用处,可给他40%,如果CPO一举冲破RM4000,影响就不会那么大。
第二个table说的是提炼设施,食油设施,棕仁油设施,每年的种子销售,这个评估很困难,所以放弃,或根据年报的资料(如有),算出合理价,最方便的办法是根据balance sheet asset填写。
第三个table不叙述。
第四个table。
把三组加起来。
评估这间公司是不是被市场关注的“大”公司。
如果这间公司是冷门股,就填“不是”,进入下一行评估,根据股息率填写股价的“动力(momentum)”系数。
因为近两年UNICO的股息率是75%,所以他的动力是75%。
Kretam不符合派息条件,所以他这两三年内都会是一滩烂泥,动力是30%。除非他被市场关注,或能恢复派息率,几时,不懂。
在马来西亚以外的市场,可斟酌。
第五个table(per share valuation),是方便你计算每股价值的。
最后的阶段,是你自己的心态阶段,如果你觉得这个modulus不能用,可斟酌。
如果你想“玩玩看”这个modulus,这里有个链接下载,试试看。我没把握,天底下没绝对的事。
【edit later:如果是Joint venture,non-wholly-owned land,可按股权调整。
如果你认为unico的地价值RM50000,他的ideal price就是61sen,正好在评估线上,RM40000只是示范而已。
marketability可以想象成,这个管理者值不值得信赖,如果他经营的手法比你经营得更好,你就给他120%甚至可以是150%,答案就是screaming buy了】
03 April 2009
UNICO的基本面已经合理了。
对于评估一个中小型种植股的合理价而言,摸索了好久,终于找到了一个不错的方法,我的计算方式是,派息率和地价的乘积。
这个方式不是我所喜欢的,但,必须接受。
如果经营一个园丘,收入-成本之后,净利所得的100%都是你的cashflow,那么这个园丘的地价就等于你的理想价了。
如果一只股票,他拥有的地皮便宜到吓死人,但是公司不给股息,你就必须做个了断,狠狠的discount他,地价 x 30% ,即为合理价, 他必须低过“这条线”,才可买入。
这条线不是固定的,他会随sector的涨跌变动,例如sector(plantation index)涨20%,那么你的这条线也要拉高20%。
UNICO把75%(没有仔细算过)的盈利分给股东,那么UNICO的合理价就是,地价 x 75%,相信目前的股价已经完全反映了价值。
可以参考以下对照表来算出合理价
即使有100%派息率,但公司不是你在管,所以算90%。
或许看过上述评估方法后,你脑海会浮现多种问题,但我无法给你超级正确的极究方向。
“100%股息公司怎么发展?”
“要怎样评估地价?”
“我怎么知道这条线在什么位置?”
“如果公司改变派息率?”
“如果老板人格零分?”
可参考是什么东西决定种植股的股价?
这不是卖出建议,也不是买进建议,因为UNICO刚好是在“这条线”运行,如果UNICO在你而言是线下面交易的,你就买进,反之卖出。
不得不佩服这样的派息率,有纷争才有进步,才有肉吃。
这个方式不是我所喜欢的,但,必须接受。
如果经营一个园丘,收入-成本之后,净利所得的100%都是你的cashflow,那么这个园丘的地价就等于你的理想价了。
如果一只股票,他拥有的地皮便宜到吓死人,但是公司不给股息,你就必须做个了断,狠狠的discount他,地价 x 30% ,即为合理价, 他必须低过“这条线”,才可买入。
这条线不是固定的,他会随sector的涨跌变动,例如sector(plantation index)涨20%,那么你的这条线也要拉高20%。
UNICO把75%(没有仔细算过)的盈利分给股东,那么UNICO的合理价就是,地价 x 75%,相信目前的股价已经完全反映了价值。
可以参考以下对照表来算出合理价
派息率 | 地价值 |
---|---|
0% | 30% |
25% | 45% |
50% | 60% |
75% | 75% |
100% | 90% |
即使有100%派息率,但公司不是你在管,所以算90%。
或许看过上述评估方法后,你脑海会浮现多种问题,但我无法给你超级正确的极究方向。
“100%股息公司怎么发展?”
“要怎样评估地价?”
“我怎么知道这条线在什么位置?”
“如果公司改变派息率?”
“如果老板人格零分?”
可参考是什么东西决定种植股的股价?
这不是卖出建议,也不是买进建议,因为UNICO刚好是在“这条线”运行,如果UNICO在你而言是线下面交易的,你就买进,反之卖出。
不得不佩服这样的派息率,有纷争才有进步,才有肉吃。
小股东监管机构建议小股东,继续持有IOIPROP
小股东监管机构建议继续持有IOIPROP,但是IOICORP不打算让IOIPROP上市。
这是好事一个,证明了李深静是个不迫害小股东的人。
为什么他收购IOIPROP,除牌,我还要讲他好话?
没错,他这么做是不对的,但他还是留了个后路给小股东,小股东有选择权要不要继续持有。
和PPBOIL,Southern bank,Maxis比较,他们吃到你干干净净,不是更阴险?
如果IOICORP事先部署好全面收购,他是可以吃到你干干净净的,他只要找几个策略性伙伴出席投票就可以了,在程序上是行得通的,只要90%通过就可以强迫你卖掉股票,即使你不卖,你的CDS户口的股票也会不见,支票会送到你家。
再阴险一点,他可以RM1.8收购你的股权。但是他没有,他给你三个offer,即,现金,IOICORP股票,和持票。
【add minutes later: 90%指的是投票率,不是大股东持有率。】
【news】
MSWG:若不接受献议 IOI产业小股东长期仍获利 2009/04/02 10:28:43
●南洋商报
(吉隆坡1日讯)小股东权益监管机构(MSWG)指出,IOI产业(IOIProp,1635,主板产业股)就算除牌,小股东还是能因公司的长期表现而获利。
根据资料,IOI产业将在4月7日(周二)上午9时暂停交易,该机构总执行长丽塔在文告中,为不赞成私有化献议的小股东提出了3项建议。
一、他们仍能在4月6日(周一)脱售IOI产业股票,至5点闭市时;
二、他们能致函予IOI集团,并以相同的价格献售本身的股票,
三、他们仍在除牌后的IOI产业中拥有股票。
她补充,对于那些想在除牌后的IOI产业中,继续持有股权的投资者,将面对以下4种情况。
一、他们的股票将被锁在除牌后的IOI产业中;
二、往后他们将获得由IOI产业派发给IOI集团(IOICorp,1961,主板种植股)的股息;
三、IOI产业小股东的权益,将遵循1965年公司法令。若IOI产业的任何交易需要召开股东大会寻求小股东的同意,IOI产业的小股东仍有能力决定会议的定案;
四、IOI集团是上市公司,因此IOI产业的小股东将知晓前者有关的活动。
丽塔强调,IOI产业就算除牌,其小股东往后仍拥是有“力量”的一群。
这是好事一个,证明了李深静是个不迫害小股东的人。
为什么他收购IOIPROP,除牌,我还要讲他好话?
没错,他这么做是不对的,但他还是留了个后路给小股东,小股东有选择权要不要继续持有。
和PPBOIL,Southern bank,Maxis比较,他们吃到你干干净净,不是更阴险?
如果IOICORP事先部署好全面收购,他是可以吃到你干干净净的,他只要找几个策略性伙伴出席投票就可以了,在程序上是行得通的,只要90%通过就可以强迫你卖掉股票,即使你不卖,你的CDS户口的股票也会不见,支票会送到你家。
再阴险一点,他可以RM1.8收购你的股权。但是他没有,他给你三个offer,即,现金,IOICORP股票,和持票。
【add minutes later: 90%指的是投票率,不是大股东持有率。】
【news】
MSWG:若不接受献议 IOI产业小股东长期仍获利 2009/04/02 10:28:43
●南洋商报
(吉隆坡1日讯)小股东权益监管机构(MSWG)指出,IOI产业(IOIProp,1635,主板产业股)就算除牌,小股东还是能因公司的长期表现而获利。
根据资料,IOI产业将在4月7日(周二)上午9时暂停交易,该机构总执行长丽塔在文告中,为不赞成私有化献议的小股东提出了3项建议。
一、他们仍能在4月6日(周一)脱售IOI产业股票,至5点闭市时;
二、他们能致函予IOI集团,并以相同的价格献售本身的股票,
三、他们仍在除牌后的IOI产业中拥有股票。
她补充,对于那些想在除牌后的IOI产业中,继续持有股权的投资者,将面对以下4种情况。
一、他们的股票将被锁在除牌后的IOI产业中;
二、往后他们将获得由IOI产业派发给IOI集团(IOICorp,1961,主板种植股)的股息;
三、IOI产业小股东的权益,将遵循1965年公司法令。若IOI产业的任何交易需要召开股东大会寻求小股东的同意,IOI产业的小股东仍有能力决定会议的定案;
四、IOI集团是上市公司,因此IOI产业的小股东将知晓前者有关的活动。
丽塔强调,IOI产业就算除牌,其小股东往后仍拥是有“力量”的一群。
02 April 2009
bldplnt some news
bldplnt的2007年平均产量是18.34 ( BLD 的每 ha 生产量),这比起其他的sarawak-based company 好多了
swkplnt产量15(大约)
rsawit产量15.44
twsplnt产量16.9(全马),但它有30%在sabah和西马,所以应该也是15。
比SOP的20差。
经和网友讨论一翻后,我得到的结论是,sarawak土地种类是和产量关系不大的,土地等级(grade)才是,要经土测鉴定。
rsawit的地全是mineral soil,产量也不高。
以下是Henry Lau的演讲,如果他说的target属实,那么bldplnt就能算一只值得拥有的股了。
比较担心的是,去年(2008)中段,骗子特别多,说实话的反而是傻子,他会不会是傻子呢?
虽然说产量增加的原因可能是种植地库的增加,没值得高兴的,但,好过没有,因为有产量就有cash flow。
不可忽略的是,sarawak-based company不能创造出20%的IRR(rate),投资这类的停滞型(stagnant)公司,报酬预期不能太高。你只能寄托sector的上涨来带动他的股价,twsplnt是一个好例子(投资不如不买,买不如投机)。
但BLD算很好的了。
BLD PLANTATION NEW ESTATE IN SARAWAK
04 August 2008
BLD PLANTATION NEW ESTATE IN SARAWAK BLD PLANTATION will invest some RM110m to develop 6,000ha of new oil palm plantations in Sarawak in the next three years.
Executive Chairman - HENRY LAU LEE KONG said the Company would be aggressive in its new planting programme as more than half of its 53,000 ha land bank had not been developed. He said it was timely to increase the planted area as prices of crude palm oil (CPO) had been good.
The Group currently has about 23,000 ha planted with oil palm, with half of the plantations already producing fresh fruit bunches (FFBs). In three years, another 6,300 ha of matured planted areas will be added said LAU after the Company's AGM on Jun 17, 2008.
FORECAST CROP OUTPUT
In 2007, the Group's FFB production increased 3.6% to 211,000 tonnes. This is expected to grow to 266,000 tonnes this year (2008), 290,000 tonnes in 2009 and 320,000 tonnes in 2010.
LAU said expanding the Group's planted hectarage would also ensure an increasing supply of related products to feed its palm oil mill, refinery and kernel crushing plant.
PALM OIL REFINING & FRACTIONATION
100%-owned unit - KIRANA PALM OIL REFINERY has invested more than RM100m in a refinery and a dry fractionation plant in Bintulu, Sarawak. Both plants are now on trial production and are expected to begin commercial production in Jul 2008.
The refinery, which has a processing capacity of about 1,200 tonnes of CPO a day, is now producing refined bleached and deodorised palm oil, palm olein, palm stearins and palm fatty acids distillate. The kernel crushing plant has a daily capacity of 300 tonnes. Its products include crude palm kernel oil and palm kernel expeller.
BLD PLANTATION would continue to look out for good plantation land locally, LAU said, adding, however, that it had no plans to expand its plantation business to Indonesia yet.
For FYE Dec 31, 2007, Group Revenue rose 13% to a record RM152m from RM134m in FY06. Net profit more than doubled to RM37.8m in FY07 from RM16.9m previously.
swkplnt产量15(大约)
rsawit产量15.44
twsplnt产量16.9(全马),但它有30%在sabah和西马,所以应该也是15。
比SOP的20差。
经和网友讨论一翻后,我得到的结论是,sarawak土地种类是和产量关系不大的,土地等级(grade)才是,要经土测鉴定。
rsawit的地全是mineral soil,产量也不高。
以下是Henry Lau的演讲,如果他说的target属实,那么bldplnt就能算一只值得拥有的股了。
比较担心的是,去年(2008)中段,骗子特别多,说实话的反而是傻子,他会不会是傻子呢?
虽然说产量增加的原因可能是种植地库的增加,没值得高兴的,但,好过没有,因为有产量就有cash flow。
不可忽略的是,sarawak-based company不能创造出20%的IRR(rate),投资这类的停滞型(stagnant)公司,报酬预期不能太高。你只能寄托sector的上涨来带动他的股价,twsplnt是一个好例子(投资不如不买,买不如投机)。
但BLD算很好的了。
BLD PLANTATION NEW ESTATE IN SARAWAK
04 August 2008
BLD PLANTATION NEW ESTATE IN SARAWAK BLD PLANTATION will invest some RM110m to develop 6,000ha of new oil palm plantations in Sarawak in the next three years.
Executive Chairman - HENRY LAU LEE KONG said the Company would be aggressive in its new planting programme as more than half of its 53,000 ha land bank had not been developed. He said it was timely to increase the planted area as prices of crude palm oil (CPO) had been good.
The Group currently has about 23,000 ha planted with oil palm, with half of the plantations already producing fresh fruit bunches (FFBs). In three years, another 6,300 ha of matured planted areas will be added said LAU after the Company's AGM on Jun 17, 2008.
FORECAST CROP OUTPUT
In 2007, the Group's FFB production increased 3.6% to 211,000 tonnes. This is expected to grow to 266,000 tonnes this year (2008), 290,000 tonnes in 2009 and 320,000 tonnes in 2010.
LAU said expanding the Group's planted hectarage would also ensure an increasing supply of related products to feed its palm oil mill, refinery and kernel crushing plant.
PALM OIL REFINING & FRACTIONATION
100%-owned unit - KIRANA PALM OIL REFINERY has invested more than RM100m in a refinery and a dry fractionation plant in Bintulu, Sarawak. Both plants are now on trial production and are expected to begin commercial production in Jul 2008.
The refinery, which has a processing capacity of about 1,200 tonnes of CPO a day, is now producing refined bleached and deodorised palm oil, palm olein, palm stearins and palm fatty acids distillate. The kernel crushing plant has a daily capacity of 300 tonnes. Its products include crude palm kernel oil and palm kernel expeller.
BLD PLANTATION would continue to look out for good plantation land locally, LAU said, adding, however, that it had no plans to expand its plantation business to Indonesia yet.
For FYE Dec 31, 2007, Group Revenue rose 13% to a record RM152m from RM134m in FY06. Net profit more than doubled to RM37.8m in FY07 from RM16.9m previously.
从potashcorp谈起
potashcorp,一间垄断世界钾肥市场的加拿大公司。
如果Google搜索“pot”,出来的答案是google finance和yahoo finance,他的股票。
potashcorp from NYSE
有的人说,高低点的涨幅是16倍,看样子应该是18倍。图中的三角形是拆股,但不像。
重要的讯息是,油棕业是高度依赖钾肥的,来看看近期截至2009年2月的钾肥走势。
每年
每公顷油棕园的氯化钾(KCI)用量是268kg,如果以USD860计,268kg费用为USD230.48,相等于RM841.25。
但,这只是港口的价钱。
算运输费,来到本地应该要1000美元/ton,经过包装混合,卖给小园主的价钱应该是1500美元/ton。
本地著名肥料厂牌推荐的K用量是1.5倍到2倍,相等于402kg-536kg的KCI含量。
如果以2倍来做参考,以上的KCI成本是RM2934.6。
1500美元 x 兑换率 x 0.536 = RM2934.6 (每公顷的钾肥成本,如果现在吨货。)
可能肥料商担心油棕树不能吸收K,所以要你放双倍,或者是他们有他们的用意?
问题是,如果他们不照放,出来的产量很差,该怪谁?
由此可知,掉落的树叶,提炼厂残余(POME),棕果外壳,都需想办法找回K。
差别在于,超大型公司的钾肥成本应该是小园主的25%。
至于另外的N肥,P肥,走势几乎和油价一样,这里不做叙述。
每年
中国的钾(K20)进口量为5.8百万公吨,如果全数以氯化钾形式入口,入口量则是9.67百万公吨。
加拿大的钾(K20)出口量是8百万公吨,如果全数为氯化钾,则是13.33百万公吨。
上面的比较,只是想说明钾肥的“规模”,
中国的钾肥需求多来自俄罗斯。
为什么近期的钾肥上涨的这么厉害?
答案是减产,垄断。
以下是北美的KCI库存量
库存增加也不会降低售价,这个局面已经僵持很久了。
若想知道成本怎么走,油价和钾肥库存也是指标之一。
油价决定N肥和P肥的生产成本。
由于马印两国的肥料进出口数据接近“高度机密”的程度,没有官方资料,因此最简单的办法是拿OSK的报告来看,他们应该是International Fertilizer Industry的注册member。
更严格的说法是,垄断的是Canpotex,因为他才是决定价格和议价的集团。
【add hours late】
猜测和联想
USD860的港口价,相信是刻意被抬高的(由于我不知道这个标价是怎么定的),实际上你可以在USD600拿到长期合约,合理价或许是USD300,但他们不卖你。
这种情况就像你到旅游区买纪念品,摊贩把价格拉高,慢慢的和你杀价。
第一种猜测
这股行情是被中国带头做坏的,因为中国只有两个财团(中化集团和中国农资集团)授予权利向海外购买,更早以前的财团是10个。
如果派出的代表不能完成任务,丝毫的猫腻,都会影响整个中国甚至世界的农业市场局势。
第二种猜测
商品被长期压抑了,目前才是合理价。
第三种猜测
商品热潮是种“集体意愿”的炒作。
回顾这一年,已能够证明,商品热潮造福了一群上游人士,这也可以解释为什么钾肥可以从100涨到800的原因了。
有人说经济萧条是FED做出来的,原因就是如此。
成本高了,卖价才能抬高,这是有能力决定成本的人的“集体意愿”,不管它们的产品属性相不相干。
如果这个猜测可以成立,那么USD860的钾肥不能算坏事,如果他跌回USD100才是坏事。
【end add】
如果Google搜索“pot”,出来的答案是google finance和yahoo finance,他的股票。
potashcorp from NYSE
有的人说,高低点的涨幅是16倍,看样子应该是18倍。图中的三角形是拆股,但不像。
重要的讯息是,油棕业是高度依赖钾肥的,来看看近期截至2009年2月的钾肥走势。
每年
每公顷油棕园的氯化钾(KCI)用量是268kg,如果以USD860计,268kg费用为USD230.48,相等于RM841.25。
但,这只是港口的价钱。
算运输费,来到本地应该要1000美元/ton,经过包装混合,卖给小园主的价钱应该是1500美元/ton。
本地著名肥料厂牌推荐的K用量是1.5倍到2倍,相等于402kg-536kg的KCI含量。
如果以2倍来做参考,以上的KCI成本是RM2934.6。
1500美元 x 兑换率 x 0.536 = RM2934.6 (每公顷的钾肥成本,如果现在吨货。)
可能肥料商担心油棕树不能吸收K,所以要你放双倍,或者是他们有他们的用意?
问题是,如果他们不照放,出来的产量很差,该怪谁?
由此可知,掉落的树叶,提炼厂残余(POME),棕果外壳,都需想办法找回K。
差别在于,超大型公司的钾肥成本应该是小园主的25%。
至于另外的N肥,P肥,走势几乎和油价一样,这里不做叙述。
每年
中国的钾(K20)进口量为5.8百万公吨,如果全数以氯化钾形式入口,入口量则是9.67百万公吨。
加拿大的钾(K20)出口量是8百万公吨,如果全数为氯化钾,则是13.33百万公吨。
上面的比较,只是想说明钾肥的“规模”,
中国的钾肥需求多来自俄罗斯。
为什么近期的钾肥上涨的这么厉害?
答案是减产,垄断。
以下是北美的KCI库存量
库存增加也不会降低售价,这个局面已经僵持很久了。
若想知道成本怎么走,油价和钾肥库存也是指标之一。
油价决定N肥和P肥的生产成本。
由于马印两国的肥料进出口数据接近“高度机密”的程度,没有官方资料,因此最简单的办法是拿OSK的报告来看,他们应该是International Fertilizer Industry的注册member。
更严格的说法是,垄断的是Canpotex,因为他才是决定价格和议价的集团。
【add hours late】
猜测和联想
USD860的港口价,相信是刻意被抬高的(由于我不知道这个标价是怎么定的),实际上你可以在USD600拿到长期合约,合理价或许是USD300,但他们不卖你。
这种情况就像你到旅游区买纪念品,摊贩把价格拉高,慢慢的和你杀价。
第一种猜测
这股行情是被中国带头做坏的,因为中国只有两个财团(中化集团和中国农资集团)授予权利向海外购买,更早以前的财团是10个。
如果派出的代表不能完成任务,丝毫的猫腻,都会影响整个中国甚至世界的农业市场局势。
第二种猜测
商品被长期压抑了,目前才是合理价。
第三种猜测
商品热潮是种“集体意愿”的炒作。
回顾这一年,已能够证明,商品热潮造福了一群上游人士,这也可以解释为什么钾肥可以从100涨到800的原因了。
有人说经济萧条是FED做出来的,原因就是如此。
成本高了,卖价才能抬高,这是有能力决定成本的人的“集体意愿”,不管它们的产品属性相不相干。
如果这个猜测可以成立,那么USD860的钾肥不能算坏事,如果他跌回USD100才是坏事。
【end add】
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